This article explains, in accessible terms, the role of the International Criminal Court, the arrest warrants issued in the context of the war in Ukraine, the rationale behind the new Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression created under the auspices of the Council of Europe, and the European Union’s position in support of these mechanisms. It then analyses what this means concretely for Romania: its duty to cooperate with the ICC (including to arrest wanted persons on its territory), the compatibility of these obligations with the Constitution and domestic law, possible political and diplomatic frictions, and the implications for regional security.
We will also look at practical scenarios: what if a wanted official transits through Romania? How would an official visit be treated? What happens if Romania receives a request for surrender to the ICC or to the Special Tribunal? Finally, we will outline the role of defence lawyers in cases involving elements of international criminal law – whether they act for suspects, victims, witnesses or companies exposed to international sanctions and investigations.
1. The International Criminal Court and the Ukraine Situation
1.1. What is the ICC and which crimes does it prosecute?
The International Criminal Court (ICC), based in The Hague, is the first permanent international criminal court created by the Rome Statute in 1998. It has jurisdiction over four core international crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression. Its jurisdiction is complementary to that of states – meaning that it steps in when national authorities are unwilling or unable genuinely to investigate and prosecute such crimes.
As of mid‑2025 there are 125 States Parties to the Rome Statute, including Romania and, since 1 January 2025, Ukraine itself.1 States Parties are obliged to cooperate with the Court, including by arresting and surrendering persons wanted by the ICC and by providing evidence and other forms of assistance.
The crime of aggression, introduced through the so‑called Kampala Amendments, concerns the decision by a state’s leadership to plan, prepare, initiate or execute a manifest violation of the UN Charter through the use of armed force. It is therefore a “leadership crime” targeting those at the top of the political and military pyramid, not ordinary soldiers.
1.2. Ukraine’s status and the opening of the ICC investigation
Long before becoming a State Party, Ukraine used the mechanism in Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute to accept the ICC’s jurisdiction by declaration for crimes committed on its territory. It did this twice, in 2014 and 2015, covering crimes from November 2013 onwards, including those arising from Russia’s aggression.2
On 2 March 2022, the ICC Prosecutor announced the opening of a formal investigation into the Situation in Ukraine, following referrals by a group of ICC member states and based on the Ukrainian declarations.3 The investigation focuses on alleged war crimes, crimes against humanity and possibly genocide committed in the context of the conflict.
On 25 October 2024, Ukraine deposited its instrument of ratification of the Rome Statute with the UN Secretary‑General. The treaty entered into force for Ukraine on 1 January 2025, making it the 125th State Party to the Rome Statute and also the 46th state to ratify the Kampala Amendments on the crime of aggression.4 From that date, Ukraine fully participates in the Assembly of States Parties and in the Court’s governance structures, while also continuing to cooperate closely with the Office of the Prosecutor.
1.3. ICC arrest warrants in the Ukraine situation
The most widely known decision in the Ukraine situation is the set of arrest warrants issued on 17 March 2023 by Pre‑Trial Chamber II against Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, President of the Russian Federation, and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova‑Belova, the Russian Presidential Commissioner for Children’s Rights.5 They are alleged to be responsible for the war crime of unlawful deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children from occupied territories to the Russian Federation.
On 5 March 2024, the ICC announced further arrest warrants against Lt. Gen. Sergei Kobylash and Admiral Viktor Sokolov, senior Russian military commanders, for war crimes and crimes against humanity linked to missile attacks against Ukraine’s critical infrastructure.6
On 24 June 2024, Pre‑Trial Chamber II issued additional arrest warrants for former Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov, also in relation to large‑scale attacks on Ukraine’s energy system and civilian infrastructure.7
These warrants share a common feature: they target the very top of Russia’s political and military leadership. As of late 2025, none of the individuals has been surrendered to the ICC, but the warrants remain valid indefinitely. All ICC States Parties are legally obliged to arrest and surrender them if they enter their territory.8
2. Why the ICC cannot (currently) prosecute the crime of aggression in the Ukraine case and why a Special Tribunal is being created
2.1. The crime of aggression and the jurisdictional gap
Although the Rome Statute includes the crime of aggression, the ICC’s jurisdiction over this crime is subject to additional conditions. In particular, when the alleged crime of aggression is committed by nationals of, or on the territory of, a state that is not party to the Rome Statute, the Court’s jurisdiction generally depends on a referral by the UN Security Council. Given that Russia is not a State Party and is a permanent member of the Security Council with veto power, such a referral is politically unlikely.
This means that, while the ICC can and does investigate and prosecute war crimes, crimes against humanity and possible genocide committed during the war in Ukraine, it cannot, under the current legal framework, exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression committed by Russia’s leadership in launching the invasion.
2.2. The Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine
In response to this gap, Ukraine and a coalition of states and institutions pushed for the creation of a dedicated mechanism: the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine (STCAU). After lengthy legal and political discussions, the Council of Europe decided in 2025 to host such a tribunal.9
On 25 June 2025, in Strasbourg, the President of Ukraine and the Secretary General of the Council of Europe signed the bilateral Agreement establishing the Special Tribunal.10 The Tribunal is conceived as an ad hoc international criminal court with a strong Ukrainian component, intended specifically to prosecute those bearing the greatest responsibility for Russia’s crime of aggression.
According to public information, the Tribunal will build on Ukrainian criminal law (especially Article 437 of the Ukrainian Criminal Code on aggression), but will have international judges and prosecutors and will operate with safeguards comparable to those of the ICC: independence, fair trial guarantees, victim participation mechanisms and witness protection programmes.11
Its mandate will focus on top‑level political and military leaders responsible for the decision to launch and maintain the full‑scale invasion, not on lower‑level soldiers or officials. In this sense, it complements the ICC, which continues to focus on war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.
2.3. The role of the International Centre for the Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression (ICPA)
Before the Tribunal becomes fully operational, evidence is being collected and analysed by the International Centre for the Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine (ICPA), hosted by Eurojust in The Hague. The Centre brings together prosecutors from Ukraine and several partner states to coordinate investigations, preserve evidence and prepare case files that can later be used by the Special Tribunal and by national authorities.12
For Romania, participation in these structures – directly or through EU mechanisms – is not merely a matter of solidarity with Ukraine. It is also a way of strengthening regional security and the rule‑based international order that underpins Romania’s own strategic position.
2.4. Critiques and expectations from civil society
International NGOs such as Amnesty International, the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and the International Commission of Jurists support the establishment of the Special Tribunal, but emphasise several conditions: genuine independence, transparent procedures, strong victim participation and robust witness protection schemes.13
At the same time, parts of the legal doctrine warn about potential criticisms of “selective justice” or regional bias if only one conflict leads to a special tribunal. The response is usually that the scale and nature of Russia’s aggression – a major violation of the UN Charter by a permanent member of the Security Council – make this situation uniquely dangerous for the international order, justifying an exceptional response.
3. The European Union’s position: support for the ICC and for the Special Tribunal
3.1. Political and financial support for the ICC’s work on Ukraine
From the early months of the full‑scale invasion, the European Union positioned itself as a key supporter of international criminal justice in Ukraine. In June 2022, the European Commission announced a project worth €7.25 million to support the ICC Prosecutor’s office in investigating international crimes committed in Ukraine, including by strengthening data‑storage capacities for large volumes of digital evidence.14
The EU also helped set up and finance a Joint Investigation Team (JIT) on alleged core international crimes involving Ukraine and several EU Member States, with Eurojust playing a central coordination role.15 The ICC Prosecutor joined this JIT – a first in the Court’s history – thus creating an unprecedented level of cooperation between international and national prosecutors.
More broadly, the EU repeatedly stresses that all its Member States are parties to the Rome Statute and that the Union “fully supports the ICC in its investigations into war crimes and other international crimes committed in Ukraine”.16
3.2. EU support for the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression
In parallel, EU institutions have explicitly endorsed the idea of a Special Tribunal for the crime of aggression. In May 2025, the European Commission underlined that the Union is “strongly committed to ensuring full accountability for the crime of aggression committed by the Russian leadership”, in particular through the establishment of a Special Tribunal in cooperation with the Council of Europe and Ukraine.17
The EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs has stressed that war crimes can be prosecuted by the ICC, whereas the crime of aggression requires a dedicated mechanism, precisely because of the jurisdictional limits of the ICC in relation to non‑State Parties such as Russia.18 This division of labour – ICC for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide; Special Tribunal for aggression – is central to the European vision of an “ecosystem of accountability”.
EU Member States, including Romania, are expected to contribute politically, financially and technically to the Tribunal’s work: seconding judges or prosecutors, providing experts, hosting witnesses and victims, and cooperating on arrest and surrender once indictments are issued.
3.3. The role of NGOs and European civil society
European NGOs have been instrumental both in documenting crimes in Ukraine and in advocating for robust accountability mechanisms. Networks of human‑rights organisations have urged the EU to defend the ICC when it comes under political attack, arguing that weakening the Court in one situation would harm victims everywhere.
In relation to the Special Tribunal, civil society stresses the need to keep the process victim‑centred, to avoid purely symbolic trials in absentia, and to ensure that the Tribunal’s legacy supports, rather than undermines, the broader development of international criminal law.
4. Romania’s obligations as an EU and NATO state and party to the Rome Statute
4.1. Ratifying the Rome Statute and implementing it in domestic law
Romania signed the Rome Statute in 1999 and ratified it through Law no. 111/2002. Under Article 11 of the Constitution, ratified treaties form part of domestic law. This means that Romania’s obligations under the Rome Statute – including full cooperation with the ICC – have the force of an internal statute.
In parallel, Romania adopted Law no. 302/2004 on international judicial cooperation in criminal matters, which dedicates provisions to cooperation with international criminal courts, including the ICC. Article 4 establishes the primacy of international legal instruments in this area: where there is a conflict between domestic provisions and an applicable international treaty, the latter prevails in the field of judicial cooperation.
On the substantive side, the 2014 Criminal Code includes in Title XII – “Genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes” domestic offences corresponding to genocide (Article 438), crimes against humanity (Article 439) and war crimes (Articles 440–445). This allows Romanian prosecutors and courts to deal with such crimes directly under national law, even without ICC involvement.
4.2. Constitutional issues: immunities and extradition of nationals
When Romania ratified the Rome Statute, two main constitutional questions were raised: the immunity of the President and members of Parliament, and the traditional prohibition on extraditing Romanian citizens.
In its explanatory memorandum to the ratification law, Romania clarified that constitutional immunities were meant to protect legitimate official acts, not international crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes. Therefore, such crimes could not be considered “acts in office” that benefit from immunity. This interpretation paved the way for compatibility between the Constitution and the Rome Statute.
As regards the prohibition on extraditing nationals, Romania distinguished between “extradition” to another state and “surrender” to an international court. The constitutional amendment of 2003 later allowed extradition of Romanian citizens under international conventions, which further reduced any tension between domestic law and ICC obligations.
The practical effect is that, if a person subject to an ICC arrest warrant is found on Romanian territory, the authorities are under a legal obligation to arrest and surrender them to the Court, subject to judicial review of the request in line with Law no. 302/2004 and fundamental rights standards.
4.3. Cooperation with the Special Tribunal for Aggression and Romania’s likely position
As a member of the Council of Europe and of the European Union, and as a state that has consistently supported multilateralism and international criminal justice, Romania has strong reasons to back the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression.
Cooperation with the Tribunal will be based on the bilateral Agreement between Ukraine and the Council of Europe and on any subsequent instruments to which Romania becomes a party. In practice, this is likely to involve:
- incorporating cooperation obligations into Law no. 302/2004 or adopting a specific law on cooperation with the Tribunal;
- providing mutual legal assistance (execution of requests for evidence, searches, seizures, expert opinions);
- assisting with arrests and surrender of accused persons present on Romanian territory, once indictments and arrest warrants are issued;
- possibly seconding judges, prosecutors or experts to the Tribunal.
Given Romania’s foreign‑policy profile and its geographic proximity to the war, it is reasonable to expect that it will align itself with the EU’s position and support both the ICC and the Special Tribunal. A hesitant or ambiguous stance would clash with Romania’s long‑standing narrative as a pro‑European, rule‑of‑law‑oriented state.
4.4. Regional security and potential political frictions
The difficult question is not so much whether Romania has obligations (legally, it clearly does), but how to implement them in high‑stakes situations. For example, what happens if a high‑ranking Russian official under ICC or Tribunal indictment enters or overflies Romanian territory?
From a legal standpoint, Romania must enforce ICC arrest warrants. Once cooperation agreements with the Special Tribunal are in place, similar obligations may arise with respect to that body. Failure to comply could expose Romania to international responsibility and to political backlash within the EU and Council of Europe.
From a political and security angle, however, arresting a senior Russian official in a front‑line NATO state could trigger serious diplomatic tensions, hybrid threats or other forms of retaliation. This is why such situations would almost certainly be handled in close coordination with EU partners and NATO allies, to prevent Romania from being isolated in managing the fallout.
On the other hand, not enforcing international arrest warrants would send a dangerous message: that political expediency can trump legal obligations. For a country that has invested heavily in its image as a promoter of the rules‑based international order, such a signal would be strategically costly.
4.5. Romania as a NATO member: coordination rather than contradiction
NATO, as a politico‑military alliance, does not regulate international criminal justice and does not have its own mechanisms for prosecuting war crimes or aggression. Romania’s obligations towards the ICC and the Special Tribunal derive from treaties and agreements separate from the North Atlantic Treaty.
In practice, however, Romania’s membership in NATO shapes how sensitive cases would be managed. Any scenario involving the arrest of a senior Russian official would likely be preceded by intensive consultations within NATO, both to anticipate security risks and to coordinate messaging and responses.
In other words, NATO membership does not reduce Romania’s international legal obligations towards the ICC and the Special Tribunal; rather, it provides a political and security framework within which those obligations can be implemented more safely.
5. Practical scenarios: transit, official visits, extradition and arrest
5.1. Air or land transit through Romania
One scenario often discussed in legal commentary is that of an official subject to an ICC arrest warrant who transits through the airspace or territory of a State Party. If an aircraft carrying such a person lands at a Romanian airport – whether for technical reasons, an emergency or an unscheduled stop – the Romanian authorities could, in principle, arrest the person based on the ICC warrant and initiate surrender proceedings.
In practice, states usually avoid exposing wanted officials to such risks by carefully planning their travel routes. Nonetheless, Romania must have clear procedures and contingency plans for rapid, coordinated action if such a situation arises.
5.2. Official visits and immunities
A more politically delicate scenario is an official visit (for example, to a summit hosted in an ICC State Party) by a sitting head of state or other high‑ranking official under ICC warrant.
The Rome Statute states that official capacity as a head of state or government, member of a government or parliament “shall in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility”, nor bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction (Article 27). For States Parties, this is generally interpreted to mean that they cannot invoke such immunities to refuse surrender to the ICC.
However, under customary international law, certain high‑level officials enjoy personal immunities from the jurisdiction of foreign national courts while in office. The relationship between these customary immunities and obligations under the Rome Statute has generated complex legal debates, and state practice is not entirely uniform.
Romania’s earlier interpretation – that the crimes under the Rome Statute cannot be considered protected “acts in office” – places it in the camp of states more willing to give priority to ICC obligations. That said, any concrete case would likely involve detailed legal analysis and high‑level political consultations.
5.3. Extradition requests from Ukraine and surrender to the ICC or the Special Tribunal
In the Ukraine context, Romania may face three main types of requests:
- Extradition requests from Ukraine, based on bilateral or multilateral treaties and Law no. 302/2004;
- Requests for cooperation and surrender from the ICC, grounded in the Rome Statute and its implementing legislation (Law no. 111/2002 and Law no. 302/2004);
- Requests from the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression, once its cooperation regime with Member States – including Romania – is defined.
All such requests are subject to judicial review in Romania. Courts will verify that cooperation does not expose the person to torture or inhuman treatment, that they will benefit from a fair trial and that basic constitutional principles (such as the prohibition of the death penalty) are respected.
At the same time, Article 4 of Law no. 302/2004 requires Romanian authorities to interpret and apply domestic law in a manner consistent with international instruments. As a result, when the Rome Statute or the Tribunal’s founding agreement imposes clear obligations, they cannot simply be ignored in the name of “opportunity”.
5.4. Witnesses, victims and evidence located in Romania
Beyond high‑profile arrests, Romania may play a crucial role in assisting investigations by hosting and protecting witnesses and victims, and by enabling the collection of evidence on its territory.
For example, refugees from Ukraine present in Romania may have direct knowledge of war crimes or crimes against humanity. Romanian authorities can facilitate their contact with the ICC, Ukrainian prosecutors or the Special Tribunal, while ensuring respect for their rights and safety.
Cooperation may also involve executing requests for searches, seizures or digital evidence preservation. In all these situations, lawyers in Romania – both criminal defence and victim‑rights specialists – will be essential in advising individuals on their rights and obligations and in ensuring that cooperation is conducted lawfully and ethically.
6. The lawyer’s role in cases involving international criminal law
6.1. Defending persons subject to international arrest warrants or cooperation measures
A person in Romania who is the subject of an ICC warrant, an extradition request from Ukraine or a future indictment by the Special Tribunal will need specialised legal assistance. The lawyer’s task goes far beyond checking procedural formalities.
Defence counsel must be able to navigate the complex interaction between:
- Romanian criminal and procedural law;
- the Rome Statute and ICC case law;
- the Tribunal’s statute and rules of procedure (once adopted);
- applicable human‑rights standards (ECHR, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU).
Depending on the case, the lawyer may challenge the legality of arrest or surrender, raise objections based on risks of ill‑treatment or unfair trial, or argue that certain conduct falls outside the relevant crimes under international law. Coordination with counsel in other jurisdictions – including at The Hague – is often indispensable.
6.2. Advising and representing victims and witnesses
Under the ICC system, victims can participate in proceedings and may seek reparations through the Court’s mechanisms. It is expected that the Special Tribunal will have similar provisions. Victims of crimes committed in Ukraine – including those who have found refuge in Romania – may therefore have several avenues to pursue justice and reparations.
Lawyers can:
- help victims submit information and applications to the ICC or the Tribunal;
- explain the implications of confidentiality and public exposure in high‑profile cases;
- ensure that victims’ participation does not lead to re‑traumatisation or reprisals;
- coordinate claims for reparations with possible proceedings in national courts or before other bodies (for example, the Register of Damage under the Council of Europe).
6.3. Advising companies and institutions exposed to risk
The war in Ukraine and the extensive sanctions regimes in place create substantial legal risks for businesses and institutions. Certain activities may be linked – directly or indirectly – to violations of sanctions or to conduct that could be relevant for investigations into war crimes or aggression.
Lawyers specialised in business crime and compliance can help companies:
- identify and assess exposure to potential international‑crime‑related risks;
- implement internal policies to prevent involvement in sanction‑busting or in supply chains linked to war crimes;
- respond appropriately to requests for information or cooperation from international and foreign authorities.
6.4. The lawyer as a “translator” between domestic and international systems
Perhaps the most challenging aspect of the lawyer’s role in these cases is acting as a “translator between systems”: explaining to clients how domestic procedures interact with international ones, what powers the ICC and the Tribunal have, and what strategic options exist in a highly complex legal and political environment.
For clients in Romania, it is important to understand that the state has binding treaty obligations towards the ICC and, in all likelihood, towards the Special Tribunal. In many situations, the realistic focus of defence strategy will therefore be to secure a fair process and to protect fundamental rights, rather than to block cooperation altogether.
7. Conclusions: between law, politics and security
The International Criminal Court and the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine are not abstract institutions. They are concrete mechanisms through which the international community seeks to respond to one of the most serious breaches of the international legal order since the Second World War.
For Romania, as an EU and NATO member and party to the Rome Statute, these mechanisms are part of the strategic choice the country has made to anchor itself in a system based on the rule of law and multilateral cooperation. Supporting the ICC and participating in the Special Tribunal are not optional gestures but the natural consequence of this choice.
The obligation to cooperate with the ICC – including to arrest and surrender wanted individuals – and the likely future obligations towards the Special Tribunal are thus both a legal duty and a test of Romania’s consistency in foreign and security policy. At the same time, they are closely linked to regional security: allowing aggression to go unpunished would weaken the very norms that protect Romania and its neighbours from similar threats.
For citizens, lawyers and decision‑makers alike, the key is to grasp that international criminal law is not “for others only”. It shapes the environment in which Romania operates, influences its diplomatic room for manoeuvre and affects real people – suspects, victims, companies and institutions. The more familiar the legal community becomes with the ICC, the Special Tribunal and international cooperation mechanisms, the better prepared Romania will be to navigate the complex intersection of law, politics and security in the years to come.
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) on the ICC, the Special Tribunal and Romania’s Obligations
1. What is the International Criminal Court and what is it doing in relation to Ukraine?
The International Criminal Court (ICC) is a permanent court based in The Hague, created by the Rome Statute, with jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression. In relation to Ukraine, the ICC is investigating alleged war crimes, crimes against humanity and possible genocide committed in the context of the conflict. It has issued arrest warrants against several senior Russian officials, including President Vladimir Putin, for the unlawful deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children and for attacks on civilian infrastructure.
2. Why is a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine necessary if the ICC already exists?
Although the Rome Statute includes the crime of aggression, the ICC’s jurisdiction over this crime is limited, especially when the alleged aggressor state (like Russia) is not a party to the Statute and the UN Security Council is unlikely to refer the situation due to veto power. This creates a jurisdictional gap for prosecuting the Russian leadership for the decision to launch the war. The Special Tribunal, created under the auspices of the Council of Europe in partnership with Ukraine, is designed specifically to prosecute the crime of aggression and to complement the ICC’s work on war crimes and crimes against humanity.
3. What concrete obligations does Romania have towards the ICC?
By ratifying the Rome Statute through Law no. 111/2002, Romania has committed to full cooperation with the ICC. This includes the obligation to arrest and surrender persons subject to ICC arrest warrants who are found on Romanian territory, to provide evidence and other forms of assistance, and to facilitate the ICC’s investigative work. Law no. 302/2004 on international judicial cooperation sets out the procedures through which Romanian courts and authorities implement these obligations.
4. Can Romania refuse to arrest a person wanted by the ICC on grounds of immunity or political considerations?
The Rome Statute provides that official capacity as a head of state or government or as a member of a government or parliament does not exempt a person from criminal responsibility and does not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction. Romania has interpreted its constitutional immunities as not covering crimes under the Rome Statute. While political and security considerations may be discussed at governmental and international levels, a refusal to execute ICC warrants could place Romania in breach of its international obligations and could have serious diplomatic consequences.
5. How does Romania’s NATO membership interact with its obligations towards the ICC and the Special Tribunal?
NATO is a security alliance and does not regulate international criminal justice. Romania’s obligations towards the ICC and the Special Tribunal stem from other treaties and agreements. However, sensitive situations – such as the potential arrest of a senior Russian official – would likely be discussed and coordinated with NATO allies to manage security risks and political fallout. NATO membership therefore provides a framework for consultation rather than an alternative legal regime.
6. What should a person in Romania do if they are targeted by an ICC request or a procedure linked to the Special Tribunal?
A person facing an arrest warrant, extradition request or other cooperation measure related to the ICC or the Special Tribunal should immediately contact a lawyer specialised in criminal law and international judicial cooperation. The lawyer can verify the legality of the request, ensure that the person’s rights are respected in Romanian proceedings, and help coordinate defence strategy with counsel in other jurisdictions, including before the ICC or the Special Tribunal.
7. How can victims of crimes committed in Ukraine seek justice through the ICC or the Special Tribunal?
Victims can transmit information and complaints to the ICC and, once operational, to the Special Tribunal, often with the support of lawyers and human‑rights organisations. Under the ICC system, victims may participate in proceedings and seek reparations. It is expected that the Special Tribunal will also allow for victim participation and compensation. In addition, victims may use complementary mechanisms such as the Council of Europe’s Register of Damage and may bring civil claims before national courts where appropriate.