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The criminal offence of fraud: legislative and case-law analysis and perspectives

This article explains how Romanian law defines fraud, how it differs from civil disputes and which aggravating forms drastically increase penalties. It uses case-law to show how courts distinguish between bad faith and simple contractual breaches, helping you understand your risks and the type of evidence you need to support a complaint or a defence.

Introduction: the prevalence of fraud and its economic impact

Fraud is one of the most frequent offences against property in criminal practice in Romania, generating a considerable number of criminal cases every year. By its very nature, this offence of fraud produces significant economic damage both at individual level and at the level of businesses or public institutions. Studies show that the typical organisation loses around 5% of its annual revenues due to fraud, with an average loss of USD 160,000 per incident[1]. Fraud involving management (owners or directors) also tends to be more than nine times as costly as fraud committed by regular employees[1]. Sectors such as banking, manufacturing and public administration are among the most affected by these losses[1].

Beyond financial statistics, fraud has a considerable social and psychological impact. Offenders’ methods of operation are constantly evolving, often exploiting the economic and technological context. A notorious example in Romania is the so-called “Accident method”, where victims (especially elderly people) are contacted by fake doctors or lawyers over the phone and persuaded to pay sums of money under the pretext of emergencies (for example, an alleged accident suffered by a relative)[2]. This type of scam has proliferated in recent years, with offenders also taking advantage of some favourable legal provisions: after the new Criminal Code entered into force (2014), which allows reconciliation between the parties in fraud cases, more than 20 scammers using the “Accident method” escaped criminal prosecution by returning the victims’ money and obtaining their forgiveness[3][4]. This situation has raised the question of the need for a balance between redressing the damage and deterring criminal behaviour. Overall, preventing and combating fraud have become priorities both for investigative authorities and legal professionals, given the scale of the damage and the ever-growing ingenuity of perpetrators.

Regulation in the Romanian Criminal Code – Article 244: definition, aggravated forms and distinctions

Legal definition. The offence of fraud (înșelăciune) is regulated by Article 244 of the Criminal Code. Under paragraph (1) of this article, fraud is “inducing a person in error by presenting as true a false fact or as false a true fact, for the purpose of obtaining for oneself or another an unjust patrimonial benefit, if a loss has been caused”[5]. In other words, the essential elements are: (a) the act of inducing another in error (through false statements or deceitful omissions), (b) obtaining an undue material benefit for the perpetrator or another person, and (c) the victim suffering a pecuniary loss. The offence is therefore a result-based crime, consummated at the moment when the damage is produced. Attempt is punishable under Article 248 of the Criminal Code[6], which means that fraudulent conduct that is not completed (no actual loss caused) can still give rise to criminal liability.

Aggravated forms. Paragraph (2) of Article 244 provides for an aggravated form of fraud, applicable where the offence is committed by using a false name or false capacity, or other fraudulent means[7]. In such situations – for example, when the perpetrator poses as another person (false identity) or claims to hold a non-existent official/institutional capacity – the penalty is imprisonment from 1 to 5 years, higher than the 6 months to 3 years laid down for the basic form[5]. Another aggravation arises where the offence is committed by means that themselves constitute criminal offences. The Code expressly provides that, if the fraudulent means used is itself an offence, there will be a concurrence of offences between fraud and that separate offence[8]. For instance, using a forged official document to deceive the victim will attract separate criminal liability both for forgery and for fraud (real concurrence). The wording of the law clarifies that one offence does not “absorb” the other, but that they are cumulative, ensuring a punishment proportionate to the overall seriousness.

Reconciliation between the parties. A notable aspect of the legal regime is that reconciliation between the parties removes criminal liability (Article 244 paragraph (3) of the Criminal Code)[8]. Reconciliation is a bilateral legal act between the perpetrator and the injured party by which the latter expresses the will to waive criminal proceedings, usually in exchange for full redress of the damage. In fraud cases, the legislator has thus left open the possibility of resolving the criminal conflict amicably. In practice, if the damage is covered and the victim accepts reconciliation (up until the reading of the indictment in court), the criminal proceedings cease. As mentioned, this provision has had immediate effects in recent practice, with many defendants trying to “buy” forgiveness in order to avoid conviction[9]. From a criminal-policy perspective, the solution is intended to encourage redress of damage and to ease the burden on the courts, but it also raises debates about the possible perverse incentive for offenders to risk committing fraud knowing they may escape if they compensate the victim afterwards.

Distinctions from other offences

Fraud is similar to, but also distinct from, other property offences, which makes clear differentiation necessary:

  • Compared to breach of trust (Article 238 of the Criminal Code): Breach of trust consists in the misappropriation or disposal of another’s property, held under a title (e.g. a loan agreement), to the detriment of the owner. The major difference is that in breach of trust there is no inducement in error; possession of the property is acquired lawfully, but later abused. By contrast, fraud involves deception from the outset in order to obtain the property or pecuniary benefit.
  • Compared to theft (Article 228 of the Criminal Code): Theft involves taking a movable asset from another’s possession without consent, whereas fraud involves obtaining the victim’s consent (vitiated through deception) to obtain the asset or money. In practice, theft is a clandestine taking, while fraud is a voluntary but vitiated transfer of the asset by the victim[10]. The two offences exclude each other in respect of the same act – one cannot have both theft and fraud with regard to the same asset, because it was either taken without the victim’s knowledge or handed over after being induced in error.
  • Compared to computer fraud (Article 249 of the Criminal Code): Computer fraud is a distinct offence, introduced for situations where the inducement in error occurs through manipulation of a computer system or data (e.g. phishing, banking hacks). There are borderline cases where it is unclear whether a deed falls under computer fraud or “classic” fraud. For instance, posting fictitious adverts on the internet, whereby victims are asked to pay for non-existent goods, without modifying or altering computer systems, has generated interpretative divergences: is this computer fraud or fraud (înșelăciune)? The High Court of Cassation and Justice (HCCJ/ÎCCJ) settled the issue by Decision no. 37/2021 (preliminary ruling), holding that such conduct fulfils the elements of the offence of fraud under Article 244 of the Criminal Code, in the variant “by other fraudulent means”, and not those of computer fraud[11]. In practice, the mere use of the internet as a medium for conveying the lie does not automatically turn the offence into computer fraud; interference with the functioning of the computer system as such is required to trigger Article 249 of the Criminal Code[12][13].
  • Compared to fraud in contracts (înșelăciune în convenții) (under the old Criminal Code Article 215 paragraphs 3–5, now repealed): Under the former regulation, a distinction had to be drawn between mere non-performance of a civil contract and actual criminal fraud. At present, the Criminal Code no longer contains separate paragraphs on “fraud through contracts”, but case-law has held that not every breach of contract amounts to an offence. If, at the moment of concluding the contract, one of the parties had no intention of performing its obligations and used the contract merely as a façade to obtain an unjust benefit, the situation constitutes fraud (criminal dolus). By contrast, if the obligation is not performed due to subsequent causes (supervening inability to pay, negligence, etc.) without initial intent to defraud, the conduct remains within the sphere of civil liability. The distinction turns on proof of fraudulent intent at the initial moment – an often difficult evidentiary issue, which the courts analyse on a case-by-case basis.

Relevant case-law in Romania (HCCJ, Courts of Appeal, DIICOT)

Recent case-law on fraud has brought important clarifications, both through decisions of the High Court and through judgments of the Courts of Appeal or solutions at the level of specialised prosecutorial bodies (DIICOT).

Decisions of the High Court of Cassation and Justice. A significant benchmark is Decision no. 37 of 7 June 2021 of the HCCJ (Panel for the resolution of legal issues), mentioned above, by which the supreme court held that posting fictitious online adverts followed by collecting sums from victims for non-existent goods constitutes fraud and not computer fraud[13]. This judgment was given in a DIICOT case from Alba Iulia concerning a criminal group specialised in scams on international auction sites. The defendants posted adverts for non-existent products, collected money by bank transfer while claiming the existence of an escrow-type service, then delivered nothing[14][15]. The HCCJ confirmed the legal classification under Article 244 of the Criminal Code, providing courts with a clear interpretative rule in such online crime situations.

Another noteworthy decision is Decision no. 4/2016 (appeal in the interest of the law – RIL) of the HCCJ, regarding the conflict of legal classification between the offence of fraud and the offence of unlawful obtaining of funds (Article 18^1 of Law no. 78/2000) in cases of fraud involving public or EU funds. The High Court held that the use or presentation of false documents to unlawfully obtain funds from the EU budget or the state budget constitutes a single offence, namely that provided for by Article 18^1 paragraph (1) of Law no. 78/2000, punishable by imprisonment from 2 to 7 years[16][17]. In practice, such conduct is no longer classified as fraud under Article 244 of the Criminal Code but as the specific offence under the anti-corruption law (which specifically targets fraud involving funds). The decision ensured uniform practice: previously, some courts classified the conduct as fraud (Article 244 CC) in concurrence with unlawful obtaining of funds, while others as only unlawful obtaining of funds. The HCCJ opted for retaining a single special offence, avoiding double punishment[18][19]. This solution highlights the specific protection of the EU’s and the state’s financial interests through distinct criminal provisions.

Case-law of the Courts of Appeal and examples of cases. At the level of the Courts of Appeal there is extensive case-law illustrating the variety of fraud situations. For example, the Bucharest Court of Appeal has adjudicated cases of fraud in commercial contracts, where company managers deceived contractual partners about their solvency or intention to pay, obtaining goods or services on credit and then failing to pay. The courts carefully examined intent at the time of contracting – for instance, fraud was found where the defendant concealed the imminent insolvency of the company or used falsified financial statements to persuade the partner to conclude the contract. Other notable cases include bank fraud (loans obtained on the basis of forged documents), where a concurrence between fraud and forgery in documents was found, with banks acting as civil parties for the damage suffered.

Cases investigated by DIICOT. Given the complexity and frequently organised nature of many fraud schemes, DIICOT (Directorate for Investigating Organised Crime and Terrorism) has taken over various fraud cases involving criminal groups. A recent example (2025) is the dismantling of an organised group specialised in complex financial fraud: group members set up or took over companies with an apparently respectable profile (no negative history), falsified their financial statements to artificially increase their creditworthiness and then obtained bank loans or goods under leasing contracts which they had no intention of repaying[20]. The damage was considerable and the scheme also involved offences of forgery and money laundering. Another high-profile case was the so-called “Inheritance factory” in Constanța (initially investigated by the police and taken over by DIICOT): a network that identified valuable uninhabited real estate and, with the complicity of a corrupt notary, forged inheritance certificates claiming group members as the rightful heirs to the properties, which they then sold. The defendants in that case were indicted for fraud, forgery, establishing an organised criminal group, etc., illustrating how fraud can take sophisticated forms, in connection with corruption and forgery.

Overall, domestic case-law underlines the importance of proving intent and the fraudulent means used. Courts require clear evidence that the defendant knowingly deceived the victim with the aim of obtaining an unjust benefit; any doubt in this regard may tip the balance towards mere civil contractual liability. There is also an effort to unify practice (through RILs and preliminary rulings of the HCCJ) and a severe approach in serious cases (for example, exemplary penalties – even cumulated to over 20 years’ imprisonment – in cases involving multiple acts of fraud by the “Accident method”, with many victims and significant aggregate damage).

Practice in economic cases: financial fraud, public funds and digital scams

Fraud in the business environment

In the economic sphere, the offence of fraud often appears in the form of complex financial schemes. A typical example is pyramid/Ponzi schemes, where initiators mislead investors by promising unrealistic returns and use the money of new participants to pay yields to earlier ones – the scheme inevitably collapses and most participants suffer losses. The well-known FNI (National Investment Fund) case from the 2000s in Romania, although legally classified as fraud under the old Criminal Code (Article 215), exhibited all the hallmarks of a massive pyramid fraud.

Other frequent situations are banking or insurance frauds: presenting false financial statements in order to obtain loans (as mentioned in the DIICOT example) or staging accidents/thefts to collect insurance compensation (the latter may be classified separately under Article 245 – insurance fraud). In the corporate environment there are also white-collar frauds, where directors or key employees deceive the company or contractual partners, for example by falsifying sales figures, siphoning off funds under false justifications, etc. Such acts may be classified as fraud or other offences (embezzlement, forgery), depending on the specific mechanism. What is certain is that damages in these economic cases can reach very high amounts, and criminal investigations often require financial-accounting expertise and interdisciplinary knowledge.

Fraud involving funds and subsidies (international or national)

A separate category of economic fraud is that targeting public or EU funds. Romania, as an EU Member State, manages significant structural and agricultural funds; unfortunately, part of these become the target of fraud: submitting false documents on eligibility, unrealistic progress reports, over-valuation of costs in funded projects, etc. As clarified by the HCCJ RIL of 2016, such acts are classified as unlawful obtaining of funds (Law 78/2000) and punished with up to 7 years’ imprisonment[21]. The starting point is that protecting the EU’s (and the state’s) financial interests is vital, so the special anti-corruption provision applies.

In practice, the National Anti-Corruption Directorate (DNA) and more recently the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) handle numerous cases of this type, from fraud involving agricultural subsidies (APIA – e.g. fictitious farmers or incorrectly declared land) to the misappropriation of regional development funds by local authorities or contracting companies. A recent example, from November 2025, is an EPPO indictment in Bucharest in a fraud case involving irrigation funds: three individuals were committed for trial for using false documents in the implementation of four projects financed through AFIR, unlawfully obtaining around EUR 1.2 million; if found guilty, they risk penalties between 2 and 7 years’ imprisonment[22][23]. Such cases illustrate the determination of authorities to firmly punish frauds affecting public budgets, with EPPO–OLAF cooperation being essential (under their respective competences, EPPO conducts criminal prosecution and OLAF carries out administrative investigations and issues recommendations).

Digital scams and cyber-fraud

Over the last decade, digitalisation has opened a new front for the offence of fraud. Scammers have adapted quickly to the online environment, exploiting its relative anonymity and access to large numbers of potential victims. Common examples include:

  • Phishing & vishing: sending emails or messages purporting to be from banks/companies (phishing) or automated phone calls (vishing) by which victims are deceived into disclosing bank data or making payments. Although technically some acts involve the use of IT means (and may be classified as computer fraud under Article 249 of the Criminal Code), many situations materialise from the victim’s perspective as “classic” fraud – they are persuaded to transfer money themselves, under the influence of a lie (e.g. “your account has been compromised, send the money to a safe account”).
  • Fake websites and fictitious online sales: As in the case discussed in HCCJ Decision 37/2021[24][13], a multitude of scams involve online platforms. There may be ghost websites mimicking legitimate online shops or adverts on genuine platforms (OLX, Okazii, etc.) where perpetrators list non-existent products at tempting prices. Victims pay in advance (typically by bank transfer or payment services), and then the “seller” disappears. The difficulty for investigators lies in identifying the perpetrators, who often use false identities, prepaid SIMs and bank accounts opened in the name of straw persons.
  • “Romance scams” and fraud via social networks: Another form of digital fraud is romantic scams – individuals or groups who pretend to build relationships of friendship/love online (usually on Facebook, dating sites), then fabricate various financial pretexts (illness, debts, plane tickets) to extract money from victims. Again, a borderline issue arises between what constitutes criminal fraud and what might be mere victim naivety – but insofar as a repeated and deliberate scheme with false promises is proven, criminal law applies.
  • Online auction fraud and investment schemes: The internet has seen a proliferation of fictitious investment schemes (e.g. fake trading platforms for cryptocurrencies or Forex). Thousands of people worldwide have been defrauded by investing in such platforms that displayed fictitious profits on screen but in reality diverted the funds to organisers. Europol has recently coordinated major actions against such networks: for example, in 2025, authorities from nine countries arrested suspects involved in a crypto-fraud scheme of around USD 700 million, operating call centres and dozens of fraudulent investment websites[25]. Legally speaking, these mega online scams are still frauds (in continuous form and aggravated by the establishment of an organised group), even if the means of operation are high-tech.

The role of organised criminal networks

Many digital scams are not the work of mere “lone wolves”, but are driven by well-organised transnational networks. It has been observed that genuine “fraud factories” (scam farms) have emerged in various parts of the world, where hundreds of operators are employed to make calls, send messages or manage fake websites, all under the coordination of leaders who reap the financial gain. In a 2024 report, UNODC noted the emergence in Southeast Asia of “fraud companies” recruiting young IT specialists, some even through trafficking in persons, to work on scams in exchange for commissions[26][27]. This industrialised level of fraud demands ever closer international cooperation among law-enforcement bodies.

Comparative criminal law: fraud in France, Germany, Italy and the USA

The criminal laws of different states deal with the offence of fraud/deception in essentially similar ways in principle, but with notable particularities as regards definitions and sanctions.

France

The French Penal Code defines the offence of “escroquerie” in Article 313-1 CP. The definition is close to the Romanian one: inducing a person in error, by fraudulent manoeuvres (mises en scène, using a false name or false capacity, etc.), thereby causing that person to hand over property, provide services or consent to an act that causes them financial loss. The basic penalty in France for escroquerie is 5 years’ imprisonment and a EUR 375,000 fine[28].

The French Code also provides aggravated forms, with penalties of up to 7 years’ imprisonment and a EUR 750,000 fine, in situations such as: the offender uses the capacity of public official; the scammer falsely collects money for charitable causes; the victim is a vulnerable person (elderly, disabled, etc.); or the offence affects a public institution or public funds[29]. If the fraud is committed by an organised group, the maximum penalty rises to 10 years and the fine to EUR 1 million[30]. Thus, French law explicitly aggravates the offence when public authority is involved (as perpetrator or victim) or when victims are vulnerable persons, denoting a heightened concern for protecting the public interest and the weak. Escroquerie is classified as a “délit” (handled by the tribunal correctionnel), unlike in other states where it may be a felony if particularly serious.

Germany

In German law, the corresponding offence is “Betrug”, regulated in §263 StGB (German Criminal Code). The definition is similar: causing financial loss to another person by presenting false facts or distorting or suppressing true information, with the intention of obtaining an unlawful benefit for oneself or another. The basic penalty is imprisonment for up to 5 years or a fine[31]. If, however, the offence is particularly serious (besonders schwerer Fall), the law provides harsher penalties – in practice, a particularly serious case is one committed on a professional basis (gewerbsmäßig) or by an organised gang, or one causing major damage. In such situations, the penalty ranges from 6 months to 10 years’ imprisonment[32].

The German system thus distinguishes between the basic form (a delict that can even be punished by a fine for minor damage) and the qualified form (Verbrechen – felony, with a minimum of 6 months). Notably, Germany has distinct offences for certain types of fraud: computer fraud has its own provision (§263a StGB), as does fraud in favour of creditors (§263 para. 3, relevant in insolvencies), etc. One aspect emphasised in German doctrine is the clear distinction between Betrug (fraud), Unterschlagung (§246, misappropriation) and Untreue (§266, breach of trust)[33]. Essentially, Betrug always involves active deception of the victim, whereas breach of trust presupposes violation of fiduciary obligations without necessarily telling any lie to the victim – for example, an administrator using a client’s funds for other purposes. This comparative analysis highlights the degree of refinement in German law in delineating the various fraud-type offences and the relationships between them.

Italy

The Italian Penal Code (Codice penale) punishes fraud through the offence called “truffa”, set out in Article 640 c.p. The legal formula describes the offence as follows: “Chiunque, con artifizi o raggiri, inducendo taluno in errore, procura a sé o ad altri un ingiusto profitto con altrui danno…” – that is, anyone who, by artifices or deceptions, inducing someone in error, procures for themselves or another an unjust profit with damage to another, shall be punished. The penalty is imprisonment from 6 months to 3 years and a fine between EUR 51 and 1,032 for the basic form[34].

The Italian Code, however, provides aggravating circumstances in the same Article 640 paragraph 2, raising the penalty to 1 to 5 years’ imprisonment and a fine of between EUR 309 and 1,549[35][36]. The listed circumstances include: where the offence is committed against the state or a public entity (thus damaging the public budget) or under the pretext of exemption from military service; or where the scammer exploits the victim’s fear of an imaginary danger or their mistaken belief that they are complying with an authority’s order[36].

Italy has also introduced specific autonomous offences: Article 640-bis c.p. (truffa aggravata per il conseguimento di erogazioni pubbliche) punishes aggravated fraud to obtain public funds, and Article 640-ter c.p. (frode informatica) covers fraud by IT means[37]. A procedural particularity: in its basic form truffa is an offence prosecuted upon complaint of the injured party (querela di parte)[38][39]. Only in the aggravated cases listed (significant damage, public victim, etc.) does public prosecution act ex officio. Thus, the Italian system leaves a key role to the victim’s will in initiating criminal proceedings, somewhat similar to reconciliation in Romanian law, but at an even earlier stage (if the victim does not file a complaint, the authorities cannot act). This approach probably reflects the view that minor frauds, without major public interest, can be left to the initiative of the injured party.

United States of America

In the US legal system there is no single, general equivalent of the offence of fraud as found in European penal codes. Being a common law and federal system, “fraud” is more of an umbrella concept covering numerous specific offences defined in federal or state statutes. At federal level, there are offences such as mail fraud (18 U.S.C. §1341), wire fraud (18 U.S.C. §1343), bank fraud (§1344), securities fraud, healthcare fraud, etc. Each of these has particular elements but essentially involves deliberate deception with the purpose of obtaining something of value by inducing the victim in error – similar to the core of the Romanian offence of fraud[40][41].

Interestingly, US criminal law does not offer a general statutory definition of “fraud”; its meaning has been shaped by case-law. US courts have described fraud as “the deprivation of someone’s property by dishonest methods or schemes of deception, in violation of fundamental principles of honesty and fair dealing”[42]. Practically, what would be encompassed by Article 244 of the Romanian Criminal Code appears in the US system split across multiple statutes. For example, wire fraud (using interstate electronic communication to commit fraud) is punishable by up to 20 years’ imprisonment (and even 30 years where financial institutions or declared disaster situations are involved), reflecting how severely the federal system treats such acts.

At state level, many states provide offences of “theft by deception” or “false pretences”, covering classical fraud scenarios. Penalties depend on the seriousness of the loss – they may be misdemeanours if the damage is small or felonies if it exceeds a certain threshold. A notable cultural-legal aspect is the extensive use of civil mechanisms (the tort of fraud) alongside criminal ones; in practice, many cases of financial fraud are settled through civil suits or regulatory proceedings, with criminal law reserved for large-scale schemes or those with significant social impact (such as the Bernard Madoff case, responsible for a Ponzi scheme of around USD 65 billion – he was sentenced to 150 years’ imprisonment at federal level).

In short, comparatively, the core principles are similar (protection of property against deception) but: France and Italy emphasise detailed aggravating circumstances in the legal text; Germany has a graded system of seriousness and distinct related offences; the USA adopts a fragmented approach to the notion of fraud through multiple targeted laws. In all jurisdictions, the challenges remain common: proving fraudulent intent and adapting legislation to new forms of fraud.

International aspects: online fraud, OLAF, Europol, cross-border cooperation, fraud against the EU’s financial interests

Fraud knows no borders – especially in the digital age, perpetrators and victims can be in different countries and the money can transit multiple jurisdictions. Accordingly, combating large-scale fraud requires close international cooperation.

Cross-border online fraud

Many of the digital scams mentioned (phishing, fake investments, fictitious online sales) operate globally. For example, a group based in Eastern Europe may defraud citizens in Western Europe or the USA via the internet. Cross-border investigations involve judicial cooperation (letters rogatory, European Investigation Orders) and police cooperation (information-sharing through channels such as INTERPOL, EUROPOL).

An illustrative case, reported in recent media, is that of a global fraud network involving credit card fraud and money laundering dismantled in 2025, which used the infrastructure of payment processors in Germany to illegally debit millions of cards worldwide, disguising the payments as fictitious online subscriptions[43][44]. That investigation involved more than 60 searches and 18 simultaneous arrests in Germany, the USA, Canada, Singapore, Cyprus, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, etc.[45] – a complex cooperative effort coordinated by Europol and the German authorities. The suspects are to be charged with organised computer fraud, money laundering and establishing a criminal organisation[46]. This example shows the ability of criminal networks to stretch across borders and, at the same time, the importance of coordination mechanisms (Europol played a key role in operational data exchange).

The role of OLAF and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO)

In terms of protecting the EU’s financial interests, two bodies are particularly noteworthy. OLAF (European Anti-Fraud Office) is the administrative body that investigates fraud affecting the EU budget. OLAF conducts its own investigations (without criminal coercive powers) and issues recommendations to national authorities when it uncovers irregularities or fraud. According to OLAF’s 2022 report, the Office completed 256 investigations in one year, recommending the recovery of over EUR 426 million to the EU budget and protecting approximately EUR 200 million in undue expenditure by stopping suspicious payments[47]. OLAF identified fraud and irregularities amounting to over EUR 620 million in 2022[48][49] – figures that illustrate the magnitude of the phenomenon at European level. Romania, as a significant recipient of EU funds, appears consistently in OLAF’s statistics. For instance, in the 2019 report, our country was mentioned in connection with more than 10% of the EU funds fraud cases analysed by OLAF at that time, indicating persistent issues in managing EU funds.

Complementing OLAF, the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) has been operational since 2021, led by a former head of Romania’s DNA. EPPO has competence to investigate and prosecute offences affecting the EU budget (fraud, corruption involving EU funds, cross-border VAT fraud over EUR 10 million, etc.) in participating states (including Romania). EPPO essentially takes over the most complex fund-related cases, working with European Delegated Prosecutors in each country. Its advantage is the ability to conduct unified cross-border investigations without having to resort to the cumbersome procedures of letters rogatory – which shortens timelines and increases effectiveness.

EPPO has already led notable actions: the aforementioned irrigation case in Vâlcea (Romania)[22], another case concerning a EUR 9.5 million IT project where EPPO and OLAF together uncovered a complex fraud and money laundering scheme[50], or at European level an EPPO investigation in Italy leading to the indictment of six persons in a EUR 100 million mafia-linked agricultural funds fraud (announced in 2025)[51]. In short, EPPO is becoming a key player in the EU-wide fight against fraud, and Romania – with numerous EPPO investigations – benefits from this new cooperative architecture.

Police cooperation through Europol and INTERPOL

For fraud not directly involving EU funds, coordination often falls to Europol (the EU law-enforcement cooperation agency) and INTERPOL at global level. Europol has units dedicated to economic-financial and cybercrime, providing analytical and operational support to Member States. Many joint operations have been organised under Europol’s umbrella in recent years against fraud networks: from scam call centres in Asia (where Europol helped identify European victims and repatriate funds) to operations such as “First Light” (a global initiative against vishing and love scams) or Operation EMMA against online romance fraud. A telling example: in October 2025, the Latvian Police, supported by Europol, dismantled a cybercrime network specialised in online fraud in Europe, arresting seven suspects and seizing infrastructure used for phishing (Euronews/Europol report). This kind of multinational cooperation is becoming standard practice in combating large-scale fraud, reflecting the fact that criminals collaborate across borders, so police forces must also cooperate.

Customs fraud and associated illicit trafficking

A particular mention is due to frauds that harm the budget by avoiding payments due to the state – for example, smuggling classified as fraud against the state (when goods are brought in illegally and fraudsters attempt to mislead customs authorities about taxes/excise). OLAF reported that, in 2022, in addition to classic financial fraud, it contributed to the seizure of 531 million smuggled cigarettes and 14.7 million litres of illicit alcoholic beverages[52][53] – activities likewise connected to obtaining an unjust benefit by deceiving the state (avoiding taxes). These actions show that the notion of fraud is broad and can intersect with “traditional” organised crime (smuggling, counterfeiting of products, etc.), requiring multi-agency approaches.

International judicial cooperation

At the legal level, international conventions play an important role. Romania is a party to the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC, Palermo 2000) – which does not expressly mention fraud but obliges states to cooperate on serious offences, including fraud, where committed by organised groups. There is also the EU Convention on the protection of the financial interests of the Communities (1995, now consolidated by the PIF Directive 2017/1371) – the latter has led to strong criminalisation of fraud involving EU funds and has driven adjustments in domestic legislation (e.g. clearer definitions of VAT and EU fund fraud, with proportionate penalties).

Within the EU, instruments such as the European Arrest Warrant and the European Investigation Order are frequently used to bring perpetrators of cross-border fraud to justice. Experts also point to the need for harmonising definitions and sanctions at European level – although fraud remains a national offence, there is a desire to prevent offenders from exploiting differences (the tactic of operating from the country with the most lenient penalties).

In conclusion, at international level, fraud has become a global problem, requiring concerted efforts: from real-time information exchange to joint investigation teams (JITs) and common legislative initiatives (such as those at EU level). Bodies like OLAF, Europol, EPPO and INTERPOL are components of the broader mechanism to counter fraud that transcends national borders.

Practical issues: distinguishing fraud from non-performance of contracts, proving intent, assessing damage

The practical application of the law in fraud cases raises a series of challenges and sensitive aspects frequently encountered by practitioners (lawyers, prosecutors, judges):

  • Fraud or mere non-performance of a contract? This is arguably the most delicate issue of distinction. Any failure to fulfil a contractual obligation (non-repayment of a loan, non-payment of an invoice, non-performance of a contract) may seem like “fraud” from the injured party’s perspective. However, criminal law intervenes only if it is proven that from the very outset the debtor intended not to pay and misled the creditor about an essential circumstance (financial situation, real purpose, etc.). Case-law has often articulated the principle that “not every breach of contract is of a criminal nature”, to prevent civil disputes from being turned into criminal complaints. A clear sign of fraud is, for example, presenting guarantees or documents which turn out to be forged at the time of contract conclusion, or knowingly concealing facts which, if known, would have prevented the contract from being concluded (e.g. the company was insolvent). In practice, proof of fraudulent intent at the moment of the agreement is crucial. This may be inferred indirectly from the circumstances: a pattern (the perpetrator has “scammed” other parties in the same way), immediately cutting off contact with the victim after obtaining the asset, refusing any discussion, or using the asset in a way incompatible with the promised purpose, etc. The usual defence of defendants is that they had good intentions but “could no longer” pay afterwards – the prosecution’s task is to rebut this narrative with objective elements proving the criminal plan.
  • Proving fraudulent intent. Intent (dolus) in fraud has two components: knowledge of the falsity of the statements (or of the situation created) and the will to induce the victim in error in order to obtain the benefit. As a rule, direct confession of such intent is absent – rarely will a defendant admit “yes, I knew I was lying and I wanted to cause a loss”. Therefore intent is inferred from facts. For example, if someone claims to sell an asset they know does not belong to them or does not exist, the intent to defraud is obvious. If someone promises a guaranteed financial return of 50% in one month (an impossibility under normal market conditions), it may be inferred that they deliberately misled clients. Another example: the defendant concludes several contracts of sale for the same asset (sold to multiple persons at once) – this demonstrates fraudulent intent. Assessing circumstantial evidence is the judge’s task, and defence counsel will attempt to offer innocent alternative explanations (e.g. “my client genuinely believed he would be able to perform the contract, but unforeseen factors intervened”).
  • Analysis of damage and causation. Fraud, being a result-based offence, requires the existence of damage. Damage means a certain reduction in the victim’s patrimony – either by loss of an asset/money or by assuming a disadvantageous pecuniary obligation (e.g. the victim signs a detrimental contract under deception). Disputes may arise in practice concerning the valuation of damage: for example, if the victim paid RON 10,000 for a counterfeit product worth only RON 1,000, is the damage RON 9,000 (the difference in value) or the entire amount? Usually, the whole sum paid (RON 10,000) is treated as damage, while the fake product is assigned zero value (having none of the promised utility). Another issue is where the damage is subsequently recovered – recent case-law indicates that even if the defendant repays the money (sometimes to obtain reconciliation), the existence of the offence is not erased; only the penal consequences may be mitigated. Causation requires that the loss be the result of the deception. If the victim would have suffered the loss regardless of the defendant’s conduct, one cannot attribute fraud. For instance, an investor loses money because the market fell – that is not fraud, but assumed risk; whereas if they lose money because a broker lied about the safety of the investment, it is a different matter.
  • Technical investigative difficulties. In modern cases, especially IT-related ones, investigators face practical issues such as identifying IP addresses, tracing fund flows through cryptocurrencies, and the need for IT expertise. Perpetrators often use anonymisation tools (TOR networks, offshore accounts, stolen identities). This prolongs investigations and sometimes leads to cases being closed because the perpetrator cannot be identified. Practically, numerous complaints about online fraud remain with “author unknown”. For civil parties, this means unrecovered damages and a sense of insecurity. The trend is to improve cooperation with private entities (banks, online platforms) to more quickly trace the flow of money and to train IT specialists within judicial police units.

In conclusion, in practice, accurate legal classification and gathering solid evidence are essential. Legal professionals must carefully navigate the thin line between criminal fraud and commercial failure, build arguments regarding intent (or, as defence lawyers, cultivate doubt in this respect) and collaborate with technical experts to clarify factual mechanisms. Courts, in turn, strive to maintain a balance: not to turn every dispute into a criminal case, but also not to leave abusive fraud masked as mere “contractual arrears” outside criminal sanction.

Possible defences, mitigating circumstances, damage recovery and “settling” the case

From a defence perspective in a fraud case, there are several strategies and arguments that may be invoked, as well as procedural opportunities to mitigate the consequences for the defendant:

  • Absence of the subjective element (lack of fraudulent intent). The most fundamental defence is to deny any intent to defraud. The defendant may argue that they acted in good faith, believing in the truth of their statements or intending to honour their promise, but that subsequent circumstances beyond their control led to failure and damage. For example, in a case of non-performed contract, force majeure, sudden change in economic conditions or involuntary insolvency may be invoked. If the defence succeeds in establishing that it was a mere civil dispute and not a criminal plan, the elements of fraud are not fulfilled. Defence counsel will attempt to dismantle any evidence of prior “trickery” and argue that any inaccurate statements made by the client were not essential or resulted from misunderstanding or negligence, not criminal dolus.
  • Exclusion from the scope of criminality (e.g. insignificant lies or dolus bonus). In commercial practice there is the concept of dolus bonus, i.e. that “sales puffery” or embellishment of reality that does not exceed a certain threshold. The defence may argue that the client’s statements were harmless exaggerations (for example, overstating a product’s qualities in advertising) that a prudent person should treat with discernment. Where the misrepresentation concerns minor aspects or is obviously implausible, it may be argued that the victim was themselves negligent (excessive credulity – although, legally speaking, victim naivety does not exonerate the offender, it may weigh at sentencing). In absurd situations (the anecdotal case of selling tickets for an imaginary voyage on a spaceship to Mars), the defence might contend that the conduct is hardly credible as fraud because no reasonable person should have believed such an offer – although, conversely, there is case-law holding that “exploiting a victim’s credulity still constitutes an offence”.
  • Mistake of fact or confusion. Another line of defence is to claim that the defendant was themselves mistaken about certain circumstances and thus did not act with knowledge of the falsity. For instance, if someone sells an asset genuinely believing it is authentic but it turns out to be counterfeit, they may invoke mistake (if plausible). Or if someone conveys information they have not verified but genuinely believed to be true (e.g. a sales agent informing a client according to the briefing received, unaware that the parent company was cheating). If such lack of culpability is proven, the defendant must be acquitted (Article 30 of the Criminal Code on mistake of fact may apply).
  • Impossibility of producing damage (unsuccessful fraud). In some cases, it may be argued that, regardless of the defendant’s conduct, the victim would not have suffered any real loss. This is more a question of causation: for example, if the victim was in any event obliged to pay a sum (independent of the deception), there is no causal link. Or if the damage is zero (the victim immediately recovered their asset), it may be argued that the conduct lacked harmfulness (although attempt can still be punishable).
  • Reconciliation and withdrawal of the complaint. As discussed, reconciliation between the parties is possible in fraud and removes criminal liability[8]. This is not a classic defence denying the act, but a way of resolving the case amicably. From the defendant’s perspective, if reconciliation is possible, they may and indeed should attempt to fully repair the damage and possibly offer additional compensation to persuade the victim. As a press article reported at the beginning of the new Criminal Code’s application, many defendants in minor frauds preferred to refund the sums and “buy” the victims’ forgiveness to avoid conviction[9]. In basic fraud, the victim’s will is decisive – if they declare that they have reconciled, the prosecutor must close the case or the court must terminate the proceedings. An advantage for the defendant is that reconciliation also erases the criminal record (no conviction), as it is a ground for eliminating liability. Note: reconciliation must occur before the reading of the indictment (practically, before the trial starts in first instance).
  • Mitigating circumstances and sentencing. Where the act cannot be denied or eliminated, the defence moves to a secondary objective – obtaining the lightest possible penalty. The Romanian Criminal Code provides mitigating circumstances (Article 75), such as full redress of damage before trial (Article 75 paragraph 2 letter b). Likewise, the defendant’s sincere conduct (pleading guilty), cooperation with authorities and lack of prior record may persuade the court to move the sentence towards the minimum or even to apply non-custodial solutions. In practice, many fraud convictions (especially for small damage or first-time offenders) end with suspended sentences under supervision. Where there are circumstances that diminish seriousness (for instance, provocation by the victim, who may have been imprudent or tempted the defendant), these may be highlighted by defence counsel.
  • Plea bargain (agreement on recognition of guilt). The defendant may choose to conclude a plea agreement with the prosecutor (if they confess), obtaining in return a reduced sentence. In fraud cases, where penalties do not exceed 5 years (in aggravated form), such agreements are possible. The case is thus “settled” in the sense that the parties agree on the legal classification and the sentence (usually close to the minimum, with the one-third reduction for admitting guilt – Article 480 of the Criminal Procedure Code), and the court merely validates the agreement. For a defendant who does not see real prospects of acquittal, this path may be more advantageous than a lengthy trial.
  • Damage recovery and civil settlement. Even if criminal reconciliation does not occur (perhaps the victim refuses or public action is mandatory), redress of the damage remains essential. The defendant has an interest in paying the amount owed during the proceedings because the judge will take this into account at sentencing (possibly granting a judicial mitigating circumstance for “remorse and repair”). Moreover, if the damage is covered before judgment, the court may be more inclined to impose supervised suspension (arguing that the preventive-educational purpose can be achieved without imprisonment since the victim has been compensated).

Overall, from a defence standpoint, the key is to diminish the moral resonance of the act: to present the situation as an unfortunate accident or misunderstanding rather than a malignant plan. And where the evidence contradicts that narrative, then to express maximum remorse and provide full redress in order to obtain leniency. On the other hand, the prosecution (injured party and prosecutor) will emphasise aggravating elements: cunning, premeditation, serious impact on the victim, possible recidivism, etc., all with the aim of persuading the court to impose an exemplary penalty.

Legislative trends and possible reforms (digitalisation and protection of the EU’s financial interests)

Developments in society and technology place constant pressure on national and international legislators to adjust the legal framework on fraud. Several trends and reform directions can currently be identified:

  • Adapting to the digital era. Classical criminal codes, designed largely in the 20th century, have had to be updated to new patterns of computer fraud. Romania took important steps in 2014 along with the new Criminal Code, introducing offences such as computer fraud (Article 249) and fraud involving electronic means of payment (Articles 250–252). However, technology evolves rapidly – today there is talk of artificial intelligence used in scams (e.g. generating convincing deepfakes for fraudulent purposes, AI-produced scam emails – the so-called “FraudGPT” mentioned in reports[54]). Legislation will likely need to expressly criminalise certain conduct such as digital identity theft (for now, such acts in Romania fall under computer forgery or fraud, but there is no autonomous offence of online identity theft). Likewise, cryptocurrency-related fraud – an increasingly problematic field – may require special provisions or at least doctrinal clarification as to whether it falls under fraud or other offences (sometimes linked to money laundering, especially when crypto assets are used to hide stolen funds). The European Union, through the 2023 Markets in Crypto-Assets (MiCA) Regulation, is seeking to regulate the crypto market and prevent fraud, but domestic criminal laws are also expected to respond to new types of scams (for example, crypto pyramid schemes could be explicitly classified).
  • Reform of fraud in contracts. In Romania, after 2014, as mentioned, the separate article on “fraud through contracts” disappeared. Discussions have not ended, however – some scholars argue it would be useful to reintroduce more objective criteria in the law for distinguishing criminal from civil matters. For example, a minimum damage threshold could be prescribed for fraud to be prosecuted (avoiding criminalisation for trivial sums that can be resolved civilly), or a condition that the deception relate to an essential aspect of the contract (and not a secondary one). No such amendments have been made yet, but a trend towards “decriminalising petty fraud” may emerge in debates – similarly to how petty theft of consumption (electricity) was handled by introducing an administrative threshold.
  • Strengthening the protection of the EU’s financial interests (implementation of the PIF Directive). Directive (EU) 2017/1371 on the fight against fraud affecting the Union’s financial interests (PIF) was implemented in Romanian law mainly through the offences in Law 78/2000 and through accession to EPPO. However, if practical gaps are identified, we may see increased penalties for EU funds fraud or clearer definitions of certain elements (e.g. what happens if the damage is below a certain threshold – in some countries there is a de minimis threshold below which acts are only administrative offences). There is also talk at EU level of possibly extending EPPO’s competence to other types of cross-border fraud (e.g. major VAT fraud below the current thresholds) – which would require domestic legislative changes on competence and procedure.
  • Procedural digitalisation and preventive tools. A legislative trend is also to use technology for preventing fraud. For example, laws on electronic identification and secure electronic signatures can reduce the risk of identity fraud. Romania has recently adopted the Law on electronic identity (2022), which, once implemented, could lower the number of frauds based on false identity documents or long-distance impersonation. At the same time, there is debate about joint databases (between banks and law-enforcement) allowing rapid blocking of accounts used in fraud; possible laws obliging online platforms to verify sellers’ identities (to reduce anonymity of scammers on websites). Such measures do not belong to the Criminal Code but are complementary – a kind of “the law prevents, the Criminal Code punishes”.
  • Revisiting the reconciliation regime in fraud. Experience in recent years, with dozens of scammers avoiding liability by reconciling (the “Accident method” example – 90% of them being repeat offenders taking advantage of the new law[4][9]), has generated criticism. A current of opinion argues that, at least for aggravated forms or repeat fraudsters, reconciliation should not be allowed. So far, the legislator has not excluded fraud from reconciliation (as with qualified theft or robbery, for which reconciliation is not available), probably for policy reasons (reconciliation encourages recovery of damage). Nonetheless, if abuse is found in practice, future proposals may seek to abolish reconciliation in fraud or limit it (for instance, allow it only once, not for repeated offences).
  • Raising awareness and legal education. As a general trend, it is evident that many frauds succeed due to the public’s lack of information. Legislators and authorities focus on awareness campaigns (e.g. police run periodic anti-fraud campaigns – “Don’t believe everything you are told on the phone”, “Check before you pay”, etc.). Although these are not legislative reforms per se, they go hand in hand with legal changes to prevent offences, not only to punish them.

In conclusion, in the future we can expect more nuanced and technical fraud legislation, keeping pace with new modus operandi, as well as a focus on effectively protecting public money (national and EU). Romania, as part of these efforts, will likely continue to adjust its Criminal Code and special laws, influenced by European developments (where harmonisation in economic crime is a constant goal).

Conclusions: prevention, legal practice and real risks

Prevention remains the first line of defence against fraud. From a practitioner’s perspective, it is important to promote vigilant conduct among clients: companies should vet business partners (due diligence) before entering into contracts; citizens should be educated not to send money to strangers based on unverified promises; institutions should strengthen internal control mechanisms to detect fraud. A specialised lawyer can help companies with anti-fraud training and implementing compliance policies designed to reduce the risk that employees or collaborators are involved in fraud (either as perpetrators or as collateral victims).

As regards legal practice, lawyers play a key role both in defending those accused of fraud and in representing injured parties. For defence lawyers, such cases are challenging by their complex nature: they often require understanding elaborate commercial transactions or financial mechanisms, involve large volumes of documents and sometimes technical knowledge (IT, accounting). A lawyer must be prepared to work with experts (court accountants, IT experts) to dismantle accusations or relativise the damage. On the other side, lawyers for injured parties must be proactive in gathering evidence at an early stage, assisting investigative authorities with information and bringing parallel civil actions to recover losses if criminal proceedings drag on.

The real risks associated with the offence of fraud are substantial. For perpetrators, the obvious risk is criminal: although penalties may seem moderate in the basic form (maximum 3–5 years), in practice – especially where there are multiple acts and victims – courts may cumulate sentences leading to many years of imprisonment, sometimes to be served effectively (in flagrant cases, for repeat offenders, etc.). Even a suspended sentence comes with a criminal record affecting later professional life and an obligation to redress the damage, failing which suspension may be revoked. In addition to legal risk, a “scammer” assumes personal risks – possible retaliation from defrauded victims (not infrequently scammers are directly confronted by those they deceived, with potential for violence), loss of reputation and social ostracism.

For victims, the obvious risk is financial: they may lose a lifetime’s savings or valuable assets. For companies, major fraud may lead to insolvency. There is also an emotional impact – feelings of humiliation and betrayed trust that can leave psychological scars. Furthermore, even if the perpetrator is caught and convicted, effective recovery of damages is not guaranteed (if they have hidden/spent the money and enforcement finds no assets). Hence the saying “better to prevent than to cure”: it is preferable to be cautious and avoid victimisation than to place blind trust and then run for years through the courts seeking justice.

Ultimately, the offence of fraud remains a perfidious enemy of social and economic order because it undermines one of the basic values of coexistence – trust. Legislators, practitioners (lawyers, judges) and civil society must work together to maintain an environment where honesty is the rule and attempted fraud is the harshly punished exception. Through information, vigilance and firm application of the law, the impact of fraud can be reduced, thereby protecting individual patrimonies and the proper functioning of the economy. At the same time, lawyers are tasked with ensuring that, in the fight against fraud, the procedural rights of all parties (including those accused) are respected and that each case is judged fairly on its merits. In today’s context, marked by technological innovation and interconnectivity, the challenge will be to keep up with the ingenuity of offenders, continuously adapting both preventive and repressive measures to ensure effective protection of patrimonial values and good faith in civil and commercial dealings.

The cases analysed and recent developments show that the Romanian judiciary has gained solid experience and case-law in fraud, gradually aligning itself with international best practices and reacting to new fraud patterns. Public awareness remains essential – an informed and cautious population is the most fertile ground for discouraging scammers. And for those tempted by “easy profit” obtained through trickery, the message of legislation and the courts is increasingly clear: the risks outweigh the illusory benefits, and punishment is only a matter of time, especially in an ever smaller and more cooperative world in the fight against fraud.

Selected bibliography and legislative/case-law sources

  • Romanian Criminal Code, Article 244 (Fraud)[5] and Article 249 (Computer fraud)[55] – legislatie.just.ro (Portal Legislativ).
  • HCCJ Decision no. 37/2021 (preliminary ruling) – published in Official Gazette no. 707/16.07.2021, on the classification of fictitious online adverts as fraud[11].
  • HCCJ Decision no. 4/2016 (RIL) – on the relationship between the offence of fraud and unlawful obtaining of funds, resolved in favour of applying Article 18^1 of Law 78/2000[16][17].
  • French Criminal Code, Articles 313-1 – 313-2 (Escroquerie) – Service Public, France (penalties 5 years / EUR 375,000, respectively 7 years / EUR 750,000 in aggravated cases)[28].
  • German Criminal Code, §263 StGB (Betrug) – penalty up to 5 years or a fine; severe cases up to 10 years[32].
  • Italian Criminal Code, Article 640 (Truffa) – fraud: 6 months – 3 years and fine; aggravated forms 1 – 5 years[35].
  • Mediafax – “Metoda Accidentul: peste 20 de escroci s-au împăcat cu victimele” (2014 news on the effects of the new Criminal Code and the use of reconciliation in fraud cases)[3][4].
  • Avocatnet.ro – “ICCJ: obținerea pe nedrept de fonduri europene…” (2016 article on HCCJ RIL Decision no. 4/2016)[21].
  • Economica.net / Agerpres – “Raport OLAF 2022: fraude și nereguli de peste 620 milioane €” (OLAF statistics for 2022)[48][47].
  • EPPO – Press release 11.11.2025: “Three indicted in €1.2 million fraud (irrigation projects)”[22][23].
  • The Record (Recorded Future News) – “Europol bust global fraud ring using German payment firms” (news 05.11.2025 on dismantling an international card fraud network)[43][45].
  • Wikipedia (ro) – “Înșelăciune” (general information and statistics on the cost of fraud)[1].
  • Comsuregroup.com – “UNODC Paper on Organised Fraud – key findings” (12.11.2024 summary of UNODC findings on global organised fraud)[26][27].
  • Escroquerie | Service Public[28][29][30].
  • Truffa (ordinamento italiano) – Wikipedia[34][35][36][37][38][39].
  • “The Definition of Fraud” – by Randall Eliason – Sidebars[40][41][42].
  • OLAF uncovered fraud and irregularities worth over €620 million in 2022 – Economica.net[47][48][49][52][53].
  • “IT project in Romania was a €9.5 million fraud and money laundering scheme …” – Comsure[50].
  • EPPO indicts key suspects in €100 million mafia-linked fraud case[51].

[1] Fraud – Wikipedia
https://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C3%8En%C8%99el%C4%83ciune

[2] [3] [4] [9] The “ACCIDENT” method: Over 20 scammers reconciled with victims and escaped criminal prosecution
https://www.mediafax.ro/social/metoda-accidentul-peste-20-de-escroci-s-au-impacat-cu-victimele-si-au-scapat-de-urmarire-penala-12411609

[5] [6] [7] [8] CRIMINAL CODE (A) 01/04/2018 – Portal Legislativ
https://legislatie.just.ro/Public/DetaliiDocument/223635

[10] [31] [32] [33] Fraud in criminal law – Gabler & Hendel
https://www.gabler-hendel.de/en/betrug-im-strafrecht/

[11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [24] [55] DECISION 37 07/06/2021 – Portal Legislativ
https://legislatie.just.ro/Public/DetaliiDocument/244415

[16] [17] [18] [19] [21] HCCJ: Unlawful obtaining of EU funds may be punished only with imprisonment of up to 7 years
https://www.avocatnet.ro/articol_43000/ICCJ-Ob%C5%A3inerea-pe-nedrept-de-fonduri-europene-poate-fi-sanc%C5%A3ionat%C4%83-doar-cu-inchisoarea-de-pan%C4%83-la-7-ani.html

[20] UPDATE/ORGANISED CRIMINAL GROUP SPECIALISED IN …
https://politiaromana.ro/ro/stiri/update-grup-infractional-organizat-specializat-in-inselaciune-delapidare-si-fals-in-inscrisuri-destructurat

[22] [23] Romania: Three indicted in €1.2 million fraud involving irrigation systems | European Public Prosecutor’s Office
https://www.eppo.europa.eu/en/media/news/romania-three-indicted-eu12-million-fraud-involving-irrigation-systems

[25] [43] [44] [45] [46] Europe police bust global fraud ring that used German payment firms to launder millions | The Record from Recorded Future News
https://therecord.media/europe-police-bust-global-fraud-ring-payment-firms

[26] [27] [54] The UNODC Paper on Organised Fraud – a real and present danger | Comsure, Jersey
http://www.comsuregroup.com/news/the-unodc-paper-on-organised-fraud-a-real-and-present-danger/

[28] [29] [30] Escroquerie | Service Public
https://www.service-public.gouv.fr/particuliers/vosdroits/F1520

[34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] Truffa (ordinamento italiano) – Wikipedia
https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truffa_(ordinamento_italiano)

[40] [41] [42] The Definition of Fraud – by Randall Eliason – Sidebars
https://www.sidebarsblog.com/p/the-definition-of-fraud

[47] [48] [49] [52] [53] OLAF uncovered fraud and irregularities worth over €620 million in 2022 – Economica.net
https://www.economica.net/olaf-a-descoperit-in-2022-fraude-si-nereguli-de-peste-620-de-milioane-de-euro_673375.html

[50] IT project in Romania was a €9.5 million fraud and money laundering scheme …
http://www.comsuregroup.com/news/it-project-in-romania-was-a-95-million-fraud-and-money-laundering-scheme/

[51] EPPO indicts key suspects in €100 million mafia-linked fraud case
https://www.eppo.europa.eu/en/media/news/romania-eppo-indicts-key-suspects-eu100-million-mafia-linked-fraud-case