Revision in Criminal Proceedings

Introduction: The role of extraordinary remedies and the correction of miscarriages of justice

The criminal justice system recognizes that, in exceptional situations, miscarriages of justice may occur even after ordinary remedies of appeal have been exhausted. Revision is one of these extraordinary remedies, meant to secure the correction of serious errors and the achievement of material justice.[1][2] Unlike appeal or contestation, revision intervenes after the judgment has become final, which makes it a remedy of last resort. On the one hand, the principle of legal certainty requires that final judgments remain stable (res judicata). On the other hand, the right to a fair trial and the imperative of establishing the truth justify the existence of exceptional instruments for correcting obvious miscarriages of justice or the serious inequities produced by final judgments.[3][4]

The role of revision, as well as of other extraordinary remedies (such as contestation in annulment or appeal in cassation), is precisely to reconcile these two requirements: ensuring the firmness of court decisions and, at the same time, allowing the correction of injustices when new elements appear or when there are fundamental flaws in the previous adjudication. In the absence of such mechanisms, persons wrongfully convicted would remain without any recourse, undermining confidence in the administration of justice. Furthermore, the existence of revision is also a safeguard against intentional errors (procedural fraud, judicial corruption, etc.), allowing the judicial system to self-correct such exceptional situations.

Revision is part of the category of extraordinary remedies regulated by the Romanian Code of Criminal Procedure, alongside contestation in annulment, appeal in cassation, appeal in the interest of the law and contestation concerning the duration of the proceedings. Being a special procedure, revision does not automatically reopen the case in full ex officio; instead, it involves going through a preliminary screening phase (admission in principle) and then, where appropriate, a retrial of the case on the merits. In what follows, we will detail the domestic legal framework of revision, the differences between revision in favour of the convicted person and revision to their detriment, the relevant case-law, a comparison with other jurisdictions, as well as the implications at European and international level.

Regulation of revision in the Code of Criminal Procedure (Articles 453–459 CPP)

The Code of Criminal Procedure sets out the strict conditions under which a final criminal judgment may be subject to revision. The grounds for revision are exhaustively listed in Article 453(1) CPP, being intended to cover exceptional situations in which the final judgment is tainted by essential factual or legal elements. The grounds for revision provided by law are the following:[1][5]

• Discovery of new facts or circumstances that were not known when the case was decided and which prove the lack of sound basis of the judgment delivered (Article 453(1)(a) CPP).[1]
  This ground (also called novum) presupposes the appearance of evidence or factual circumstances that were not taken into account initially and which, had they been known, could have led to a different solution (usually acquittal or a more favourable outcome for the convicted person).
• False testimony by witnesses or experts – the judgment was based on the statement of a witness, the opinion of an expert or the translations of an interpreter who was subsequently found to have committed the offence of false testimony in that case, thereby influencing the solution.[6]
  In essence, if a key witness or expert lied intentionally and this influenced the result of the trial, revision may be requested.
• Forgery of documents – a document used as a basis for the judgment was declared forged, either during the trial or after the judgment was delivered, and this influenced the solution (Article 453(1)(c) CPP).[7]
• Offences committed by judges or investigators – a member of the trial bench, the prosecutor or the criminal investigation body committed an offence in connection with the case (e.g. bribery, unlawful repression), which influenced the solution delivered (Article 453(1)(d) CPP).[8]
• Irreconcilable final judgments – where two or more final court judgments cannot be reconciled, that is, there are different final solutions with regard to identical facts or circumstances (Article 453(1)(e) CPP).[9]
  This ground covers, for example, the classical situation in which two different persons are convicted separately for the same act in a way that creates a logical conflict between the judgments, making revision necessary in order to eliminate the inconsistency.
• Subsequent declaration of unconstitutionality of the legal provision on which the judgment was based (Article 453(1)(f) CPP).[10]
  This ground applies when, during the proceedings leading to the final judgment, an exception of unconstitutionality was raised and, after the judgment became final, the Constitutional Court (CCR) upheld the exception and declared unconstitutional the legal provision applied. If the effects of the constitutional breach continue to be produced and cannot be remedied except by revising the case, revision of the judgment may be sought.[11] In practice, letter (f) gives the convicted person the possibility to benefit from a favourable CCR decision obtained precisely in their case, by reopening the proceedings.

Restrictions on certain grounds for revision

The law also provides restrictions regarding the invocation of some grounds for revision. According to Article 453(3) CPP, the grounds under letters (a) and (f) – i.e. discovery of new facts and unconstitutionality of the legal provision – may be invoked only in favour of the convicted person (or of a person in respect of whom renunciation of punishment or postponement of punishment was ordered).[12]

This limitation initially aimed to protect the acquitted person from being put again at risk on the basis of new facts or the declaration of unconstitutionality of the law (an aspect related to the principle non bis in idem). However, this legislative solution was partially struck down by the CCR: Constitutional Court Decision no. 2/2017 declared unconstitutional the exclusion of the ground in letter (a) (new facts) from the scope of revision to the detriment of the defendant.[13] The CCR held that if overwhelming new evidence emerges regarding the guilt of a person who was previously acquitted, an absolute prohibition on reopening the proceedings would undermine the search for truth and the public interest.[14]

As a consequence, after the publication of Decision no. 2/2017, the authorities did not intervene legislatively within the statutory time limit, so the restrictive solution was removed from the legal order.[15] At present, revision for new facts may also be requested to the detriment of an acquitted person, subject to the conditions of admissibility (we will detail below the strict time limits in this case). However, the limitation for the ground under letter (f) – unconstitutionality of the law – remains applicable, which can only be invoked in favour of the convicted person (which is logical, since only the convicted person in the case where the exception was raised can benefit from the CCR decision; other persons convicted on the basis of the same legal provision generally do not have a direct route to revision – an aspect considered debatable, as we will see in the section on practical issues).

Relevance condition for the grounds for revision

Article 453(4) CPP also sets out the relevance condition for the grounds for revision: the new facts or circumstances (letter (a)) must demonstrate the lack of sound basis of the judgment of conviction, renunciation of punishment, postponement of punishment or termination of the criminal proceedings; and the grounds under letters (b)–(d) and (f) constitute grounds for revision only if they led to an unlawful or ill-founded judgment.[16] In other words, not every new fact or instance of forgery automatically triggers revision, but only if it would have a decisive influence on the soundness or lawfulness of the solution.

Proof of the grounds for revision (Article 454 CPP)

The proof of the grounds for revision is regulated by Article 454 CPP. For the grounds listed under letters (b)–(d) (false testimony, forged documents, offence committed by a judge), the law requires that the existence of the alleged situation be attested by a final court judgment (for example, the conviction of the witness for perjury, the finding of forgery in another case).[17]

If such a judgment cannot be obtained (because there is an impediment preventing criminal liability, such as the death of the witness before the forgery trial), then the proof of the grounds under (b)–(d) may be made directly in the revision procedure by any means of evidence.[18] This provision ensures that there is no deadlock situation (impossibility of revision solely because the author of the forgery can no longer be formally convicted).

Persons entitled to request revision (Article 455 CPP)

The persons who may seek revision are listed in Article 455 CPP. A request for revision may be filed by:

• the parties to the proceedings, within the limits of their procedural standing (the defendant, the civil party, etc.);
• a family member of the convicted person (spouse, close relative) even after their death – but only if the request is in favour of the convicted person;[19]
• the prosecutor, who may also request revision ex officio (but only with regard to the criminal limb of the judgment).[20]

In practice, the prosecutor may initiate revision both in favour of the convicted person (for example, if serious indications of a miscarriage of justice emerge) and to their detriment (if major incriminating elements are discovered).

Form and content of the application (Article 456 CPP)

The form and content of the application are regulated by Article 456 CPP:

• The revision request must be addressed to the court that tried the case in the first instance (the trial court).[21]
• It must be submitted in written form, reasoned, indicating the ground for revision invoked and the evidence supporting it.[21]
• Copies of the documents used as evidence must be annexed, certified as true to the original, and if they are in a foreign language, certified translations must be attached.[22]

The law provides that, if the request does not meet these formal requirements, the court shall instruct the applicant to remedy the deficiencies within a set time limit, under the sanction of rejection (pursuant to Article 456(4) and Article 459(5) CPP).[23]

Time limits for lodging the revision request (Article 457 CPP)

The time limits for lodging a revision request are essential and are laid down in Article 457 CPP.

General rule – revision in favour of the convicted person

The general rule is that revision in favour of the convicted person may be requested at any time – even after the sentence has been served or if the convicted person has died (their heirs may continue the proceedings to rehabilitate their memory).[24] This temporal openness reflects the principle that it is never too late to correct a miscarriage of justice to the detriment of a person (for example, when evidence of innocence appears decades later).

There is, however, a notable exception: for revision based on the ground in letter (f) (legal provision declared unconstitutional), the request must be lodged within one year of the date of publication of the CCR decision in the Official Gazette.[25] Thus, if, for instance, the CCR declares unconstitutional the provision on the basis of which X was convicted, X has one year to seek revision of the final judgment. This limitation is justified by the need for celerity and legal certainty, so that final judgments are not kept indefinitely in a state of uncertainty following constitutional changes.

Strict time limits – revision to the detriment of the convicted person

By contrast, for revision to the detriment of the convicted person (i.e. where a worsening of the situation of a person already tried is sought – usually to overturn an acquittal or a termination of criminal proceedings), the law imposes strict and short time limits: three months from the date of discovery of the new facts or circumstances, within certain limits.[26]

More precisely, Article 457(2) provides that the three-month time limit runs as follows:

• if the new facts/circumstances (grounds under (b)–(d)) are not established by a court judgment: from the date on which they became known to the person seeking revision, but no later than three years from the date on which they occurred;[27]
• if those grounds have been established by a final judgment (for example, the witness was convicted for perjury in another case): from the date on which that final judgment became known to the revision applicant, but no later than one year from the date on which that criminal judgment became final;[28]
• for the ground of irreconcilable judgments (letter (e)): the time limit runs from the date on which the party became aware of the existence of all the irreconcilable judgments.[29]

These strict time frames protect the legal certainty of the acquitted or non-convicted person, avoiding placing them indefinitely under the threat of re-trial.

There is also an absolute limitation: revision to the detriment of the defendant cannot be carried out if a ground has intervened that prevents the initiation or continuation of the criminal action (Article 457(4) CPP).[30] Practically, if the offence is statute-barred, or the defendant has died, or another legal impediment exists, the state may no longer reopen the case against them – even if new evidence emerges (this is also consistent with Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the ECHR on non bis in idem, which allows reopening only in restrictive conditions).

Procedure for deciding on the revision request (Article 459 CPP)

The procedure for deciding on the revision request comprises two stages:

1. Admission in principle
2. Retrial of the case

Upon receiving the request, the court sets a date for examining the admissibility in principle, and the president of the court orders the attachment of the old file.[31] This examination takes place in chambers, with the parties being summoned and the prosecutor participating; the absence of duly summoned parties does not prevent the proceedings from going ahead (Article 459(2) CPP).[32]

Admission in principle

In the admissibility in principle phase, the court verifies, on the basis of the documents submitted, whether the cumulative conditions laid down in Article 459(3) CPP are met:[33]

• the request is lodged within the time limit and by an entitled person (under Article 455 CPP);[33]
• the request complies with the formal conditions (reasoning, indication of the legal ground, annexed evidence – cf. Article 456(2)–(3) CPP);[33]
• legal grounds are invoked that may justify reopening the criminal proceedings (i.e. one of the grounds in Article 453(1) is indicated);[33]
• the facts and evidence on which the request is based were not presented in a previous revision request finally adjudicated (one cannot seek revision twice on the same ground – Article 459(3)(d) in conjunction with Article 464 CPP);[34][35]
• the new facts and evidence invoked clearly show the existence of legal grounds for revision (thus, the court makes a prima facie assessment of the relevance of the new elements);[36]
• finally, if the court granted a time limit for completing the request (Article 456(4)), that the requirements have been complied with (the request was completed).[37]

If all these conditions are met, the court will, by an interlocutory ruling, admit the revision request in principle (Article 459(4) CPP).[38] Otherwise, if any condition is not met, the revision request is dismissed as inadmissible by a judgment (Article 459(5) CPP).[39]

The law provides that:

• the interlocutory ruling admitting the request in principle is not subject to any remedy (it is anyway favourable to the applicant),
• whereas the judgment dismissing the request as inadmissible may be challenged by the same remedy as the one available against the judgment in the case (usually appeal – if the judgment targeted was delivered by a lower court).[40]

Special situation – death of the convicted person

An important procedural aspect: if the revision request concerns a convicted person who has died or if the convicted person dies after the request is lodged, the procedure does not terminate (it continues, potentially being carried on by the person’s successors), and at retrial the court will apply the provisions on termination of criminal proceedings as a result of death, without the death constituting an obstacle to analysing the merits of the request (Article 459(6) CPP).[41] This provision ensures that the reputation of a deceased person may be rehabilitated post-mortem if evidence appears showing that they were wrongfully convicted.

Provisional measures (Article 460 CPP)

After admission in principle, the court may also order provisional measures:

• suspension of the execution of the judgment subject to revision (in whole or in part);
• imposition of obligations on the revision applicant (for example, if at liberty, not to leave the locality, under Article 215 CPP).[42]

These measures are laid down in Article 460 CPP and may be ordered either at the same time as admission in principle or later, during the revision proceedings.[43]

• Suspension of execution is subject to a contestation that may be lodged within 48 hours by the prosecutor or the interested parties, and if the prosecutor lodges a contestation, it has suspensive effect (Article 460(2) CPP).[44]
• If the convicted person whose sentence was suspended does not comply with the obligations imposed, the court may revoke the suspension and resume execution of the sentence (Article 460(3) CPP).[45]
• In cases of irreconcilable judgments (letter (e)), Article 460(4) requires that those cases be joined in order to be retried together.[46]

Retrial of the case (Article 461 CPP)

The retrial of the case after admission in principle takes place under the rules governing trial in the first instance (Article 461(1) CPP).[47]

• The court may readminister all the evidence taken in the initial trial, if it considers it necessary, and may also take new evidence proposed by the parties or which appears necessary.[48]
• If the court considers that it cannot establish the facts directly or that this would entail an excessive delay, it may order the prosecutor to conduct further investigations within a maximum period of three months (Article 461(3)–(4) CPP).[49] At the end of the investigations, the prosecutor forwards the material to the competent court, which resumes the trial.

The law prohibits certain persons from being heard again as witnesses at retrial: thus, persons who committed the offences referred to in Article 453(b) and (d) (false witness and corrupt magistrate) may not be heard as witnesses in the case subject to revision if the proof of the revision ground was made through a court judgment (Article 461(5) CPP).[50] For example, if a witness was separately convicted for false testimony, rehearing their false statement would be meaningless in terms of evidence at retrial; the court will retry the case on the basis of the finding of false testimony, not by rehearing that witness.

Solutions after retrial (Article 462 CPP)

Following retrial, the court has two categories of solutions:[51][54]

1. If the revision request is well-founded
   • The court will annul the initial judgment, to the extent to which revision was admitted, and will deliver a new judgment in the case.[51]
   • For instance, if a person convicted of murder produces conclusive proof that the allegedly killed victim is alive, the court will admit the revision, annul the conviction and order acquittal.
   • If there are irreconcilable judgments (ground (e)), the court will annul the conflicting judgments and deliver a single solution, avoiding contradiction.[52]
   • In practice, the court delivers a new judgment on the merits as a result of retrial, applying, mutatis mutandis, the provisions on deliberation and drafting (Articles 395–399 CPP).[53]
2. If the revision request is unfounded
   • The court will dismiss the request by judgment and, if the sentence’s execution had previously been suspended, will order the resumption of its execution.[54]
   • The applicant will also be ordered to pay the court costs to the state.[54]

The judgment delivered after retrial in revision is subject to ordinary remedies in the same way as the initial judgment (Article 463 CPP).[55] Thus, if the retrial took place before the tribunal (as first instance court), the solution of admission or dismissal on the merits of the revision may be appealed before the court of appeal by the interested parties.

One final important element: Article 464 CPP provides that, if a revision request has been dismissed as inadmissible or unfounded, no new revision request may be lodged on the same grounds.[56] This prevents abuse of rights – a revision applicant cannot submit repeated requests relying on exactly the same alleged new evidence. However, if thereafter other new elements appear, different from those previously dismissed, a new request may be lodged (res judicata does not apply to different revision grounds).

Special revision based on ECtHR judgments (Article 465 CPP)

Revision where there are ECtHR judgments: although not directly covered by Articles 453–459, it is worth mentioning that the CPP contains in a separate section (Article 465) a special revision procedure for situations in which the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has found a violation of fundamental rights in a criminal case.

• Article 465 CPP (initially introduced in 2014 and supplemented in 2022) allows revision of a final judgment if the ECtHR has found a violation of the Convention that continues to have serious consequences and can be remedied only by reopening the proceedings.[57][58]
• The right to seek revision on this ground belongs to the person whose right was violated, to family members of the convicted person (if the request is in their favour) and to the prosecutor,[59] the time limit being three months from the publication in the Official Gazette of the ECtHR judgment.[60]

This special procedure reaffirms Romania’s commitment to enforcing the judgments of the Strasbourg Court by providing an effective domestic remedy.

In conclusion, the domestic legal framework of revision is restrictive and technical, designed to maintain a balance between the stability of judgments and the need to correct fundamental miscarriages of justice. The strict conditions for admissibility, the short time limits in cases of revision in peius and the limitation of grounds for revision reflect the exceptional nature of this remedy.

Revision in favour of the convicted person versus to their detriment: comparative analysis and procedural safeguards

One of the particular features of revision is that it may be used both to the benefit of the convicted person and, in certain situations, to their detriment (i.e. against a solution of acquittal or termination of proceedings). This duality raises delicate issues of principle related to protection against double jeopardy (ne bis in idem) and the fairness of the procedure.

Revision in favour of the convicted person (pro reo)

Revision pro reo is the typical situation and, historically, the main reason why this institution emerged: to remedy miscarriages of justice whereby an innocent person has been convicted. The Romanian legislature has been generous in this respect – there is no time limit for attempting to correct a wrongful conviction (with the exception of the special case of CCR decisions, which anyway has a different framework).[24][25]

Thus, regardless of whether months or decades have passed since the conviction, if new facts, forgeries or other elements emerge showing that the solution was mistaken, the convicted person (or their successors) may request revision. This gives effect to the principle that judicial truth cannot contradict factual truth – if it is discovered that a person is serving a sentence for an act they did not commit or on the basis of compromised evidence, the justice system has the moral and legal duty to restore their liberty and reputation.

Procedurally, revision in favour of the convicted person provides enhanced safeguards:

• there is no time bar (apart from revision based on CCR decisions, where the person was a party anyway);
• once revision is admitted in principle, the court may suspend execution of the sentence (Article 460 CPP).[42]

In practice, where indications of a miscarriage of justice are strong, courts generally grant suspension at the admissibility in principle stage – to avoid continuation of a potentially unlawful detention. A notorious example is that of convictions revised after many years on the basis of DNA tests or the confession of the real perpetrator: in such situations, as soon as the new evidence appears credible, the convicted person is provisionally released pending retrial.

During retrial after admission of a pro reo revision, the convicted person enjoys all procedural rights as at a first-instance trial:

• the right to defence;
• the right to adduce evidence in their favour;
• the right to legal counsel;
• the right to address the court, etc.

Moreover, under Article 462(2) CPP, if at retrial the court extends proceedings to parties who did not file a revision request (for example, co-defendants who did not seek revision), the new solution cannot worsen their situation.[61] This safeguard ensures that no one is prejudiced against their will by a revision instituted by someone else: parties who did not seek revision will either remain under the same solution as before or benefit from a more lenient one, but never from a more severe outcome than the previous final judgment.

Another important element is that, if revision is admitted and leads to acquittal or to a lighter sentence, the convicted person is entitled to restoration of the situation prior to conviction (Article 462(3) CPP).[62] The court shall order, where appropriate:

• the refund of any fine paid;
• the return of confiscated goods;
• the deletion of entries from the criminal record;
• reimbursement of court costs paid by the convicted person, etc.,

so that the effects of the annulled conviction are removed as far as possible. The person may also bring an action for compensation against the state for unlawful detention or other damage suffered, under Articles 538 et seq. CPP on compensation in case of miscarriage of justice.

In conclusion, revision pro reo is an expression of the principle of establishing the truth and material justice, which prevail over res judicata when the two are in conflict. Romanian case-law includes examples of revisions admitted in favour of convicted persons, such as murder cases where the alleged “victim” was later found alive, or cases of homonymy and mistaken identity, convictions based on false testimonies later retracted, etc. Even though, statistically, such situations are rare, the existence of the procedure is essential for correcting miscarriages of justice and maintaining public trust in the justice system.

Revision to the detriment of the convicted person (in peius)

Far more controversial is the hypothesis of revision to the detriment of the convicted person (or of the acquitted person). Here we enter the sensitive area between:

• the public interest in actually punishing the guilty, and
• the individual’s right not to be tried twice for the same act.

Internationally, the principle ne bis in idem is widely recognized (Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the ECHR, Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, various national constitutions). However, these instruments themselves provide exceptions for situations where new facts are discovered or where there has been a fundamental flaw in the first trial. For instance, Protocol No. 7 to the ECHR specifies that the prohibition of double trial does not preclude reopening of proceedings if new evidence appears or if there has been a fundamental defect in the initial proceedings.[63][64]

Under Romanian law, revision to the detriment of the defendant has traditionally been allowed only in very limited circumstances (practically similar to letters (b)–(e) of Article 453). The current Code maintained this possibility but – as we have seen – initially excluded the ground of new facts (letter (a)) for revision in peius. The CCR, however, opened the door to this ground as well in 2017, declaring unconstitutional the absolute prohibition on revising an acquittal based on the discovery of conclusive new evidence.[13][75][76]

The CCR’s argument was based on the search for truth and equality of arms: if a convicted person can seek reopening of the proceedings in light of new evidence of innocence, then, symmetrically, society, via the Public Prosecutor’s Office, must be able to seek reopening of an acquittal in light of overwhelming new evidence of guilt; otherwise, an unfair imbalance would be created.

Nonetheless, the CCR and the legislature maintained procedural safeguards designed to protect the individual from abuse:

• short time limits (three months from discovery, with a cap of three years from the occurrence of the new facts);[26][27]
• the condition that no cause preventing prosecution or continuation of the criminal action has intervened (Article 457 CPP).[30]

Thus, revision in peius is conceived as an instrument for exceptional situations, not as a regular second chance for the prosecution. In practice its use is extremely rare – normally, investigative bodies prefer to make full use of ordinary remedies (appeal, contestations) rather than relying on the prospect of future revision.

Typical situations where revision against the defendant may be used include:

• where, after an acquittal, a key witness admits that they lied or is convicted for false testimony (ground (b));
• where an essential document that led to acquittal is discovered to be forged (ground (c));
• where a corrupt judge or prosecutor is found to have “fixed” the acquittal (ground (d)).

In such situations, the state has a legitimate interest in putting the case back on the docket, since the acquittal was obtained through fraud or corruption and does not represent a proper administration of justice. The law – and international practice – considers that, in such a scenario, res judicata is tainted and may be set aside.[8]

A hypothetical example: if a person is acquitted by a judge who is later found to have taken a bribe to favour them, revision makes it possible to quash that flawed judgment and retry the case correctly. Without this remedy, a manifestly unjust solution would effectively be legitimized. Similarly, if after an acquittal authentic audio recordings of the defendant confessing to the offence are discovered, these new pieces of evidence would justify reopening the trial, despite the ne bis in idem rule, because the first trial did not have access to the truth.

Comparative perspectives on revision in peius

Different countries have adopted different approaches to revision in peius:

• Italy – revision can be brought only in favour of the defendant; there is no reopening of acquittals (strong protection of legal certainty).[64][92]
• France – traditionally allows revision only pro reo, with no mechanism to reopen a case to convict an acquitted person, despite debates on serious offences and new DNA evidence.[86][87][88]
• Germany – permits revision in peius in restrictive situations (forgery of evidence, subsequent confession by the suspect, etc.), but resists an extensive expansion. In 2021, a new ground for revising acquittals in cases of very serious offences (murder, genocide) based on new evidence was introduced in §362 StPO. In 2023, the Federal Constitutional Court declared this extension unconstitutional, citing the protection of the double jeopardy principle under the Basic Law.[65][66][89][90] The Court stressed that legal certainty requires that, after a fair trial and final acquittal, the appearance of new evidence, however compelling, should not again put the person at risk of prosecution – except in cases of procedural flaws (forgery, perjury, corruption, post-acquittal confession) which were already provided for by law.[64][67]

In Romania, the procedural safeguards designed to protect the person targeted by revision in peius include, in addition to short time limits and legal impediments (limitation, death – which stop revision), a strict judicial filter. Judges, aware of the exceptional character of the remedy, demand very strong evidence at the admissibility in principle stage.

For example, if the prosecution requests revision of an acquittal based on “new facts or circumstances” (letter (a)) – now permitted after the CCR decision – the court will rigorously examine whether those new elements were indeed unknown at the time of trial and whether they would have been capable of leading to conviction. A simple re-evaluation of the same evidence from the initial file or the late identification of witnesses who could have been found with normal diligence will not be accepted as a valid ground for revision. The courts have emphasized in case-law that revision is not a second appeal: it is not admissible to request revision merely to reassess the credibility of the same witnesses or reinterpret already known evidence under the pretext of “lack of sound basis” of the solution.[4]

There must be a truly new and objective element.

Another aspect: revision cannot worsen the situation at retrial of a person who did not request it. As mentioned, if the revision is pro reo, it cannot aggravate the situation of other defendants who did not apply for it. But if revision is in peius – and in any event, only the prosecutor may request it – at retrial the defendant concerned may, in principle, receive a more severe outcome (for example, from acquittal to conviction). However, the defendant enjoys all renewed rights of defence:

• the presumption of innocence revives for the duration of retrial;
• they may adduce counter-evidence against the new elements;
• if ultimately convicted, they will also have access to ordinary remedies (appeal) against the new judgment.

In addition, if revision was requested for a ground that later proves unfounded (the final court dismisses the revision), the initial res judicata remains intact and the person remains acquitted, with a possible right to compensation for damage if they were deprived of liberty during the procedure.

In conclusion, revision to the detriment of the defendant is a double-edged sword, used with extreme caution. It exists to prevent procedural errors or fraud from leading to the impunity of guilty persons, but is strictly circumscribed so as not to undermine the individual’s trust that a final acquittal really is final. In comparative law, Romania aligns with a moderate trend: unlike the classic Anglo-Saxon system (which traditionally prohibited any retrial after acquittal), but in line with the European Convention on Human Rights, it allows revision in peius only under special conditions. Domestic case-law on revisions in peius is very limited in number, underlining their exceptional character: successful cases have typically involved flagrant situations (witnesses or experts later convicted for corruption or false testimony, defendants who confessed after acquittal, etc.). Overall, revision in peius remains a safety-valve procedure, designed to preserve the balance between individual rights and the requirements of combating crime.

Relevant case-law: Notable decisions of the High Court of Cassation and Justice (ÎCCJ) and the Constitutional Court (CCR) on revision

Being an extraordinary remedy, revision has generated relatively few landmark cases over time, but there are several important decisions by both the High Court of Cassation and Justice (ÎCCJ) and the Constitutional Court of Romania (CCR) that have clarified interpretative aspects or addressed the constitutionality of certain provisions.

Decisions of the Constitutional Court (CCR)

• Decision no. 126/2016 (CCR) – concerned Article 453(1)(f) CPP in its initial wording, which did not limit revision to the case in which the exception of unconstitutionality had been raised. The CCR held that the legislative solution allowing revision also for persons other than the one who raised the exception was unconstitutional,[68][69] as it created unjustified positive discrimination between persons finally convicted for the same offence: only the one who had raised the exception benefitted from revision, but all other persons convicted for similar acts would also have benefitted without having been party to the CCR proceedings. The legislature reacted quickly to this decision and, through Emergency Ordinance no. 18/2016, amended letter (f) so as to require that the exception of unconstitutionality be raised in the case concerned.[69][70] Essentially, the CCR sought to prevent the mass reopening of all convictions based on an unconstitutional law, maintaining revision only for those who had had the foresight to raise the exception in their own trial. Subsequently, the CCR was asked several times to re-examine this issue (for example, Decisions no. 410/2019, 723/2019, 463/2020, 119/2022), but maintained the same line: restricting revision under letter (f) to the case in which the exception was upheld is constitutional.[71][72] The core argument: legal certainty requires that not every declaration of unconstitutionality overturn final convictions on a large scale; other remedies (pardon, interruption of execution, etc.) should exist for other convicted persons. Thus, letter (f) remains applicable only to the case in which the exception was raised, as confirmed by CCR Decision no. 311/2024 (published in January 2025),[73][74] which rejected the latest objection on this issue.
• Decision no. 2/2017 (CCR) – discussed above, was a major ruling which widened the sphere of revision in peius. The CCR upheld the exception of unconstitutionality concerning Article 457(2) CPP insofar as it excluded the revision ground in letter (a) (new facts) for requests to the detriment of the defendant.[75][76] The Court’s reasoning emphasised equality of arms and the imperative of establishing the truth. Since Parliament did not intervene within 45 days, the restrictive provision ceased to have legal effect, effectively allowing the Public Prosecutor’s Office to seek revision on the ground of discovering incriminating new facts. This judgment was met with some academic criticism, arguing that it weakened the legal certainty of acquittals, but it is in line with the logic of the European Convention (which, as noted, does not prohibit reopening in cases of new evidence). The legislature has not explicitly amended Article 457(2) after this decision, but it must be interpreted in line with the CCR’s ruling, otherwise unconstitutionality would arise again.
• Other CCR decisions – the Court has also reviewed particular provisions relating to revision. For example, CCR Decision no. 633/2018 confirmed the constitutionality of the regime under letter (f) (the case of unconstitutionality invoked only in the case itself), dismissing the complaint that it violated equality (essentially reiterating the arguments of Decision 126/2016). Likewise, Decisions no. 651/2018 and others have maintained the approach that CCR decisions do not have retroactive effect other than through the revision mechanism under letter (f); there is no fundamental right to revision for anyone following a CCR decision.[69][71][72] Other procedural issues have been discussed – for instance, a complainant argued that the lack of a time limit for revision pro condemnato (for the defendant) violated their legal certainty, but the CCR rejected this, stating that the balance is fair: the convicted person may always prove their innocence (which relates to human dignity and material justice).[4]

Overall, the CCR has played a significant role in shaping the institution of revision: it has imposed restrictions where it deemed necessary (letter (f)) and relaxed them where it saw a constitutional necessity (letter (a) in peius). CCR decisions are binding, so courts apply these interpretations directly. Practitioners must therefore be constantly aware of relevant CCR case-law when filing or opposing revision requests on constitutional grounds.

Decisions of the High Court of Cassation and Justice (ÎCCJ)

The ÎCCJ, as the supreme court, has delivered several preliminary rulings (HP) and decisions on appeals in the interest of the law concerning the uniform interpretation of provisions on revision:

• ÎCCJ Decision no. 68/2020 (HP) – the Panel for the resolution of points of law held that a revision request based on Article 453(1)(f) (declaration of unconstitutionality of a provision) may also be directed against a final criminal judgment delivered in proceedings based on Article 595 CPP.[77] In other words, the ÎCCJ clarified that not only the “main” conviction judgment may be revised on this ground, but also a separate judgment delivered, for example, in contestation against enforcement or in a procedure on the application of the more lenient criminal law (Article 595). Thus, if in such secondary proceedings a legal provision later declared unconstitutional was applied, that judgment can also be revised. The decision was delivered in January 2021 and published in the Official Gazette no. 99/2021, becoming binding on the courts.
• ÎCCJ Decision no. 2/2022 (HP) – clarified the phrase “when two or more final court judgments cannot be reconciled” in Article 453(1)(e) CPP. The question was whether this irreconcilability may also cover a conflict between a final civil judgment and a final criminal judgment on the same facts. The ÎCCJ decided (dismissing the referral) that a conflict between a civil judgment with a punitive character and a criminal judgment on the same facts does not fall within the ambit of letter (e).[78][79] Therefore, letter (e) refers to criminal judgments that conflict (for example, two different convictions for the same act in respect of different persons, or a conviction and an acquittal for the same act in respect of different persons, erroneously delivered). A criminal–civil conflict (such as a final civil decision imposing an administrative sanction and a criminal decision on the same incident) does not give rise to criminal revision – such a situation has to be handled through other mechanisms, not via criminal revision. ÎCCJ Decision no. 10/2023 (HP) followed up on the previous ruling, confirming the interpretation. The High Court again dismissed a referral concerning letter (e), reinforcing the idea that the phrase “all judgments that cannot be reconciled” refers to judgments delivered in criminal matters for factually identical or closely connected situations, not to discrepancies between criminal decisions and decisions in other branches of law.[80][81]
• ÎCCJ Decision no. 2/2015 (HP) – concerns Article 465 CPP (revision based on ECtHR judgments). The High Court clarified issues of jurisdiction: the court competent to hear a revision request based on an ECtHR judgment is the one that delivered the final domestic judgment.[82] This also follows from Article 465(3) CPP, but there had been debates as to whether the supreme court should be directly competent. The preliminary ruling established that the competent court is that which tried the case originally.
• Case-law trend – in general, the ÎCCJ has emphasised in its case-law that revision is an extraordinary and restrictive remedy. Many appeals in cassation or contestations in annulment before the ÎCCJ have concerned the way lower courts dealt with revision requests. For example, the ÎCCJ has frequently upheld decisions of courts of appeal rejecting revision pro causa when the alleged new facts were, in reality, aspects known or discussed in the initial trial but neglected by the defence. The Court has stressed that a new legal interpretation of the same factual situation or a change in case-law does not constitute a revision ground – revision must not be confused with appeal in cassation or the direct invocation of CJUE/CCR decisions where these do not fall within the statutory grounds.[2][83]

A practical example is the case-law concerning the involvement of the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI) in criminal investigations (the so-called “tactical field”). The CCR declared this practice unconstitutional in 2016 (Decision no. 51/2016), but persons finally convicted before that date could not obtain revision of their convictions on the general ground of SRI collaboration, because there was no dedicated ground in Article 453.

Some tried to invoke letter (a) – a new fact consisting in the revelation of SRI’s involvement – but the courts dismissed such requests, holding that this was not a fact or circumstance proving the lack of sound basis of the judgment itself, but a procedural flaw that did not fall under revision (but might have been relevant for contestation in annulment had it been a matter of unlawful composition of the bench, which it was not).[84][85] Such solutions were later confirmed by the ÎCCJ.

As things stand, the ÎCCJ, as guarantor of uniform interpretation, has maintained a strict approach to revision. The few revision requests admitted reflect objectively obvious situations: for example, admission under letters (b) and (c) (false witnesses, forged documents) occurred when there were already convictions of the authors of the forgeries; admission under letter (a) occurred when indisputable material evidence (DNA, recordings, etc.) was discovered, overturning the original evidence. The ÎCCJ has emphasized in several decisions that courts must rigorously filter revision requests to prevent this exceptional mechanism from becoming a substitute for appeal, cluttering courts with unnecessary retrials.

In conclusion, domestic case-law has contributed to consolidating a predictable framework for revision: the CCR has aligned the text with constitutional requirements, while the ÎCCJ has interpreted specific provisions to ensure their uniform application. For practitioners, knowledge of these case-law landmarks is essential both when filing revision requests and when defending against such requests.

Comparative law: regulation of revision in other states (France, Germany, Italy, USA, United Kingdom)

The institution of revision (or reopening of criminal proceedings after a final judgment) exists, under various names and forms, in most rule-of-law states, but with significant differences. We will briefly review the solutions in several representative jurisdictions.[3][86][87]

France

In France, the equivalent remedy is called “révision” and has traditionally been limited to situations of innocence of the convicted person.

Historically, the French Code of Criminal Procedure provided several grounds for revision (reappearance of the alleged victim, contradictory judgments, false evidence, etc.). In 2014, France reformed this area and essentially reduced the grounds to a single main one:[86][87]

• the new fact (novum) which would be capable of establishing the innocence of the convicted person.

The other grounds were considered subsumed by this one (for example, the fact that “the victim is alive” is a new fact; the conflict of judgments or false witness statements may also be new facts). A second distinct ground was added:

• the finding by the ECtHR of a violation of the right to a fair trial that led to conviction – in which case a réexamen of the case is possible (a procedure introduced following a 2016 reform).

Thus, at present, France allows revision only in two situations:

1. the existence of a new fact or element unknown that, if known, could have led to acquittal;
2. an ECtHR judgment on a breach of Article 6 requiring retrial.

Importantly, French revision is allowed only in favour of the convicted person. There is no mechanism to reopen a case to convict an acquitted person – once a person has been finally acquitted (either at first instance or in appeal), they cannot be tried again for the same act. This rule has been relaxed only in a very narrow field (terrorism / war crimes debates), but in practice France remains a system where the state cannot attack a final acquittal even if compelling new evidence of guilt appears.

Procedurally:

• revision requests are decided by a Revision Commission and then by the Cour de révision (the Court of Cassation in a special composition);
• statistics show very few requests admitted (single digits per year);
• well-known cases include Patrick Dils, wrongfully convicted in 1989 and acquitted after revision in 2002 when the real killer was found.[88]

The recent French reform sought to make the criterion of new fact more flexible, but admission rates remain low.

Germany

Germany regulates revision (Wiederaufnahme des Verfahrens) both in favour of and, traditionally, to the detriment of the defendant, but within strict limits.[89][90]

• Revision in favour of the defendant (zugunsten des Verurteilten) – permitted where new facts/evidence arise capable of casting doubt on the conviction, or where false testimony, forged documents, or offences by judges occurred. There is no time limit. Germany does not require that the defence could not have produced the evidence earlier; even if counsel was negligent, new evidence can still ground revision.[91]
• Revision to the detriment of the defendant (zuungunsten des Angeklagten) – historically allowed in four cases: false testimony, forged documents, offences by judges, and confession after acquittal.[64][89]

In 2021, Germany added a fifth ground: revision of acquittals in very serious offences (e.g. murder) based on new evidence (especially DNA). However, in 2023, the Federal Constitutional Court declared this extension unconstitutional, finding it incompatible with the double jeopardy principle protected by the Basic Law.[65][66][67][90] The Court held that:

• after a fair trial and final acquittal, the emergence of new evidence does not justify exposing the individual again to the risk of conviction,
• with the sole exception of cases where the original trial was tainted by fraud (forgery, perjury, corruption, etc.).

Germany thus returned to its traditional model: narrow revision in peius and relatively generous revision pro reo.

Italy

Italy is a classic example of a jurisdiction that does not allow revision to the detriment of the defendant.

The Italian Code of Criminal Procedure provides for revisione only in three situations:[92]

• discovery of new evidence which, together with that already presented, would inevitably lead to acquittal or to a less serious offence;
• subsequent establishment that the judgment was based on forgery (in evidence, testimonies, etc.) or that there was a miscarriage of justice;
• a situation where the ECtHR has found a violation of the Convention that influenced the conviction (Italian Constitutional Court case-law forced the legislator to introduce such a ground).

The Prosecutor cannot seek reopening of a case where the defendant was finally acquitted, even if new evidence appears. The principle of giudicato has particular strength and is seen as part of the right to personal liberty.

Examples:

• famous wrongful conviction cases (e.g. Enzo Tortora) were resolved through revision pro reo;
• in Dorigo v. Italy, the ECtHR judgment led the Constitutional Court to recognize an obligation to provide for revision in cases of unfair trials.[92]

Italy prioritises the protection of the individual from any re-prosecution after a final decision, accepting that some guilty persons may remain unpunished.

United States of America

The US system is built on the double jeopardy principle under the Fifth Amendment, which prohibits trying a person again for the same offence after acquittal.

Consequences:

• there is no procedure equivalent to revision to the detriment of the defendant;
• the prosecution cannot appeal a verdict of not guilty at federal level and in most states;
• even the discovery of new evidence of guilt cannot overcome this bar.

By contrast, convicted persons have several post-conviction remedies (not called “revision” but fulfilling similar functions):

• motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence – usually subject to short time limits;
• habeas corpus petitions, primarily for constitutional violations (e.g. suppression of exculpatory evidence – Brady violations);
• state-level statutes allowing late motions based on DNA evidence.

In the last decades, the “innocence project” movement and the Wrongful Conviction Review Program of the US Department of Justice have highlighted numerous miscarriages of justice.[93][94] The National Registry of Exonerations recorded over 3,300 exonerations between 1989–2022.

The US model:

• strongly protects acquittals (no revision in peius);
• provides a complex, fragmented framework for convicted persons to seek exoneration (appeals, habeas corpus, post-conviction DNA statutes).

United Kingdom (England and Wales)

Traditionally, the UK (England and Wales) similarly prohibited the prosecution from appealing acquittals. However, the Criminal Justice Act 2003 introduced limited exceptions:

• for certain very serious offences (e.g. murder), where new and compelling evidence appears, the Court of Appeal may authorize a new trial at the request of the Director of Public Prosecutions.
• This power is used very rarely and under strict conditions.

The main British mechanism for correcting miscarriages of justice is the Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC), established in 1995:[95][96]

• an independent body that investigates possible miscarriages of justice;
• examines applications from convicted persons;
• may refer cases to the Court of Appeal where it finds new evidence or a real possibility that the conviction is unsafe.

Statistics (up to 2024):[95][96][115]

• over 27,000 applications received;
• around 3% of cases referred to the Court of Appeal;
• about 70% of referred cases result in the conviction being quashed (i.e. roughly 2% of all applications lead to exoneration).

The UK thus maintains:

• a narrow exception to double jeopardy for serious offences (revision in peius in exceptional cases);
• a relatively permissive framework for revision pro reo via the CCRC.

Other notable examples

• Nordic states – generally allow revision pro reo and have independent review commissions (e.g. Norway’s Re-trial Commission). Revision in peius is generally not permitted (except Denmark, which allows limited reopening against an acquitted person if they confess after acquittal).
• Spain – has a revision system similar to the Romanian one, only pro condemned. In 2015, Spain introduced the possibility of revising a conviction where the relevant act has subsequently been decriminalised, and post-ECtHR judgments revision.[97]
• Common-law countries (Canada, Australia) – have review commissions similar to the CCRC (Canada legislated one in 2021). No time limit to assert innocence, but high thresholds for admission.

Overall, Romania is in the European mainstream:

• it offers relatively broad revision pro reo (no time limit);
• it allows limited revision in peius (similar to Germany or Denmark);
• it has no specialised commission like the CCRC, but a detailed court-based procedure.

The general European trend is to facilitate revision in cases of miscarriages of justice, particularly under the influence of the ECtHR, while maintaining safeguards against abuse.[3][86][87][118]

The ECtHR dimension: miscarriages of justice, convictions in absentia and the right to a fair trial

The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) does not explicitly enshrine a “right to revision”. However, the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has had a considerable impact on revision procedures in member states, mainly in two respects:[2][4][83]

1. the right to a fair trial (Article 6 ECHR) and the need for revision in the event of serious violations;
2. the right to be present at trial (convictions in absentia) and the obligation to ensure a new trial if the person did not benefit from defence.

Reopening of proceedings as a remedy for breaches of Article 6 ECHR

The Strasbourg Court has consistently held that the Convention does not, as such, guarantee the right to reopening of criminal proceedings after a final judgment.[2] States enjoy a margin of appreciation in designing extraordinary remedies.

However, where the Court finds a violation of the right to a fair trial, it often considers that retrial or reopening of proceedings is, in principle, the appropriate way to remedy the consequences of the violation.[4][83]

In other words:

• the ECtHR cannot directly order revision (it only finds the violation and may award damages);
• but, under Article 46 ECHR, states must choose adequate means of execution, and reopening is often indicated.

A leading judgment is Moreira Ferreira v. Portugal (No. 2) [GC, 2017]:[2][98][99][100][101]

• the ECtHR had previously found that the national court of appeal convicted the applicant without rehearing evidence (thus breaching Article 6);
• following that judgment, the applicant requested revision from the Portuguese Supreme Court, which refused;
• the Grand Chamber held (9–8) that the refusal did not constitute a new violation of Article 6, but stressed that states must seriously consider reopening after ECtHR judgments.

Romania implemented this obligation through Article 465 CPP (revision in the case of ECtHR judgments), already presented above.[57][58][82][102][103]

Trials in absentia and the right to retrial

One of the most frequent situations requiring revision is the conviction of a person in absentia, without them being informed or able to exercise their defence.

The ECtHR has repeatedly held that such situations breach Article 6 where:[104][105][106][107][120]

• the person was not aware of the proceedings; and
• they were not later offered a genuine opportunity to obtain a new trial once they became aware of the conviction.

A landmark case is Sejdovic v. Italy (2006), where Italy was condemned for inadequate retrial guarantees after an in absentia conviction.

In Sanader v. Croatia (2015), the applicant had been convicted of war crimes in absentia, without knowledge of the trial. Croatia refused his request to reopen. The ECtHR held that:

• Article 6 had been violated;
• the state must provide “sufficient certainty of the possibility of obtaining a new trial in his presence”.[105][106][107][120]

As a result, European states, including Romania, have amended their laws.

Romania introduced a separate remedy: contestation for reopening criminal proceedings where the person was tried in their absence (Articles 466–469 CPP). This allows any person finally convicted who was not properly summoned or informed of the trial to obtain reopening, which in practice functions as a form of automatic revision, without needing to prove new evidence.

Statistics show that the number of such contestations at the ÎCCJ is very small (under 5 cases per year),[108][109] indicating improved reliability of service and trial in person.

At EU level, Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA amended the European arrest warrant regime so that a person convicted in absentia may be surrendered only where the issuing state guarantees the right to a new trial (Article 4a of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA).[110]

Relationship between revision and the right to a fair trial

The ECtHR has also considered whether revision proceedings themselves must comply with Article 6.

The Court’s position:

• Article 6 does not automatically apply to extraordinary remedies (as they may not involve “determination of a criminal charge” anew);
• however, where a state creates a revision procedure, its operation must not be arbitrary and must respect minimum fairness (access to a court, reasoned decisions, etc.).[2][4][98][111]

Examples:

• Krombach v. France (2001) – France’s refusal of revision via a ministerial decision, without access to a court, breached Article 6 (denial of access to a tribunal).
• In Moreira Ferreira (No. 2), the minority of judges would have held that the refusal to revise amounted to a new violation, illustrating ongoing debate.

In Romania, since revision requests are examined by courts and generally with a right of appeal, Article 6 standards are broadly satisfied. Nevertheless, if revision is refused in a manifestly arbitrary manner, applicants may lodge new complaints at Strasbourg.

Overall, the ECtHR dimension confirms two trends:

• criminal procedure must provide remedies for situations of injustice (serious errors and unfair trials);
• these remedies themselves must be effective and fair.

Romania has internalised these principles via Article 465 CPP and via contestation for reopening in absentia proceedings.

Statistics on the frequency and success of revisions – Romania and Europe

Being an extraordinary remedy, revision is not used very frequently. Statistical data show that revision requests represent a small proportion of criminal cases, and the rate of admission of such requests is very low, reflecting their exceptional nature.

Romania – statistical situation

At the level of the High Court of Cassation and Justice, which hears revision cases either as a court of first instance or on appeal, the number of revision requests is modest and the percentage admitted is below 10%.

According to official statistics for 2014–2020:[112][113][114]

• only 5.62% of revisions decided by the High Court were admitted;
• appeals in cassation had an admission rate of around 15.5%;
• contestations in annulment had around 6.9%.

In terms of volume:

• the High Court registered annually between 40 and 130 revision cases;[84][85][112]
• 2014 (immediately after the new Code) saw a peak of around 130 revision requests;
• later, numbers dropped to about 50 cases/year;
• in 2017, the admission rate temporarily exceeded 10%, possibly due to the wave of CCR decisions (e.g. on SRI, on letter (a) in peius).[114]

Similar trends exist at courts of appeal and tribunals, with only a handful of revisions admitted per year.

Contestations for reopening in absentia cases are even rarer – often under 5 per year at the High Court, many dismissed.[108][109] This suggests an increasingly robust domestic system regarding presence at trial.

Europe – statistics and comparisons

At European level, there is no single centralised database on revision. However, CEPEJ reports and academic research offer partial data:[3][86][87][116][117][118]

• England and Wales (CCRC)
  • 27,000 applications since 1997;
  • referral rate ~3%;
  • about 70% of referred cases result in quashing the conviction.[95][96][115]
• France
  • pre-2014 average of 3–5 admitted revisions per year;
  • after the 2014 reform, only single-digit numbers of revisions admitted in 2014–2019 (8 admitted out of 300+ requests – ~2.6%).[86][88]
• Italy
  • 1–2 revisions admitted per year;
  • slightly higher numbers since the introduction of revision based on ECtHR judgments.[92]
• Germany
  • revision pro reo requests increasing due to DNA, but admission rates remain very low;[3][86]
  • revisions in peius are extremely rare.

CEPEJ’s 2020 report on compensation for wrongful convictions shows, for several states:[116][117]

• Poland – around 16 compensation cases/year;
• Sweden – around 7;
• Denmark – around 3;
• Romania – usually 0 or 1 case/year.

Overall, revision remains an exceptional remedy in Europe, both in volume and in success rates.

Practical problems: difficulties of admission, new evidence vs re-litigation of facts, effects of CJEU or CCR decisions

The practical application of revision has revealed several recurring problems.

1. Difficulties in admission in principle

Courts frequently dismiss revision requests at the admissibility stage (Article 459(3) CPP)[33] for reasons such as:

• “New evidence” that is not genuinely new – e.g. witness statements after trial that merely repeat previously known arguments. Courts often ask whether the evidence could have been obtained with normal diligence at trial. If yes, the request is rejected as an attempt to make up for defence negligence.
• Insufficient relevance of the new evidence – even if new, courts assess whether the evidence “clearly leads” to a ground for revision (Article 459(3)(e) CPP).[36][119] If it does not appear decisive, the request is dismissed without full retrial.
• Incomplete or unreasoned requests – failure to indicate the legal ground or to attach supporting documents leads to requests for completion; non-compliance results in dismissal under Article 459(5) CPP.[39]

These filters, although burdensome for applicants, are considered necessary to preserve the exceptional nature of the remedy.

2. New evidence vs re-litigation of the merits

A frequent difficulty is distinguishing between:

• true “new evidence” (novum) – unknown to the court and parties at the time of the judgment, and
• simple attempts to re-litigate the merits based on already known facts.

Examples:

• a newly discovered video recording supporting an alibi is classic novum;
• a late witness confirming an alibi that the defence raised at trial is often viewed sceptically – courts may consider the fact known, even if the witness is new.

Confessions by third parties (“I committed the act, not X”) generate additional problems:

• such confessions must be corroborated by objective elements;
• courts are reluctant to accept them per se, especially where the confessor has nothing to lose (already serving another sentence).

The debate also covers evidence that existed in the file but was overlooked. Most courts consider that:

• if the evidence was already in the file, even if misunderstood or underused, it is not a new fact;
• the remedy for such errors should have been appeal, not revision.

Some scholars advocate a more substantive standard focusing on the capacity of the evidence to change the outcome, regardless of temporal novelty.[3][86][87][111]

3. Effect of CCR and CJEU decisions on revision

This is a particularly topical area.

CCR decisions and letter (f)

As already seen, CCR decision no. 126/2016 restricted letter (f) to the case where the exception was raised. Consequently:

• persons convicted under a provision later declared unconstitutional cannot seek revision under letter (f) unless they themselves raised the exception at trial;[68][69][71][72]
• attempts to characterise such situations as “decriminalisation” (Article 4 CC) have produced inconsistent case-law; the dominant view is that unconstitutionality does not equal decriminalisation.

This has produced inequities:

• persons who raised the exception benefit from revision;
• others, convicted under the same unconstitutional norm, remain without a direct remedy.

De lege ferenda, many argue for extending letter (f) to all persons affected by an unconstitutional incrimination.

CJEU decisions

Conflicts between CCR and CJEU decisions (e.g. regarding specialised panels and corruption cases) generated complex scenarios:

• in some corruption cases, convictions were quashed following CCR decisions on unlawful panel composition;
• after the CJEU judgment of 21 December 2021 (C-357/19 et al.), courts were instructed to prioritise EU law and sometimes not apply certain CCR decisions, particularly where retrials would jeopardise the fight against EU-funds fraud.

Persons convicted after 2021 by the same type of panels sometimes cannot obtain retrial, despite earlier CCR decisions. They have tried to invoke revision based on:

• letter (a) – “new fact” (existence of CCR decision);
• or other avenues.

Courts have mostly rejected such requests, emphasising that:

• CCR and CJEU decisions are legal developments, not new factual circumstances, and do not fit Article 453 CPP.[82][83][111][118]

This legal triangle (CCR–CJEU–ÎCCJ) creates zones of tension where revision cannot always compensate for inconsistencies.

4. Quality of new evidence and scientific developments

Modern cases of revision increasingly rely on scientific evidence (DNA, fingerprints, digital forensics):

• convicted persons request reanalysis of samples using new technologies;
• practical obstacle: lack of funding and of an institutional mechanism (like a CCRC) to order new tests.

In Romania:

• applicants typically file a revision request together with a motion for expert analysis;
• courts sometimes deem the request admissible and order tests during retrial, but formally the applicant should already present the new expert result at the admissibility stage.

Additionally, evidence preservation is problematic:

• some biological samples are destroyed after a certain period;
• if new techniques emerge later, no material remains to test.

De lege ferenda, a reform could introduce:

• a right to request preservation and reanalysis of evidence;
• an institutional fund for post-conviction scientific tests.

5. Duration and effects of revision proceedings

The duration of revision proceedings raises issues:

• suspension of execution is optional (Article 460 CPP), and courts grant it cautiously;
• some applicants serve their entire sentence before their revision is decided; if later acquitted, they can seek compensation, but the preventive function of revision is weakened.

Conversely:

• where suspension is granted but revision is later rejected, the convicted person returns to prison, creating “stop–start” sentences and fuelling judicial hesitation in granting suspension.

6. Revision in the context of international cooperation

Revision intersects with several areas of international cooperation:

• European Investigation Orders (EIO) facilitate obtaining new evidence from other states for revision (e.g. hearing witnesses abroad, accessing foreign case files).
• Eurojust can support complex revisions with cross-border elements (e.g. new confessions by perpetrators abroad).
• Transfer of sentenced persons – if a foreign conviction is later quashed on revision, Romania must terminate enforcement.
• European arrest warrants (EAWs) – as discussed, surrender for in absentia judgments is conditional on retrial guarantees.[110]
• Classical extradition – Romania may refuse extradition if the requesting state does not guarantee a retrial after an in absentia conviction.[104][105][110]

These mechanisms show that revision is increasingly transnational. Evidence discovered abroad can lead to exonerations at home, and human rights standards on retrial after in absentia convictions are enforced via extradition and EAW procedures.

Conclusions: the role of revision in ensuring just outcomes, risks and possible reforms

Revision in criminal proceedings is, par excellence, the guarantee that justice is not blind to its own errors. Though rarely applied, its importance is major: it offers a safety mechanism within the judicial system, enabling correction of mistakes that would otherwise shake public confidence in fairness.

The main conclusions are:

• Fundamental protection for the innocent – revision pro condemned is the last bulwark for those wrongfully convicted.
  Cases such as Marcel Țundrea or Trofin in Romania, and thousands of exonerations abroad (e.g. via the CCRC or US innocence projects), illustrate its essential function.
• Instrument for self-correction of the system – through the possibility of revision in peius (limited), the justice system shows it does not tolerate impunity generated by fraud or corruption.
  Where an acquittal was obtained by bribing judges or forging evidence, revision enables restoration of legality.
• Delicate balance with legal certainty – excessive ease of revision would undermine res judicata and create perpetual uncertainty; too much rigidity may leave miscarriages uncorrected.
  Constitutional courts (notably the German Federal Constitutional Court) emphasise that legal certainty is a fundamental value.[64][65][66]
• Need for targeted reforms – several potential improvements emerge:
  • extending the revision ground for CCR decisions on unconstitutionality (letter (f)) so that all those affected by an unconstitutional incrimination can seek revision, not only those who raised an exception;[68][69][71][72][73][74]
  • creating an independent revision or innocence commission with powers similar to the CCRC (investigating suspected miscarriages of justice, ordering new tests, etc.);[95][96][115][118]
  • guaranteeing preservation and reanalysis of key evidence (DNA, digital data) over time;
  • clarifying the impact of CJEU decisions on revision and possibly introducing a specific ground for reopening where EU law requires it.
• Growing international dimension – European and international standards (ECtHR, EU Charter, Framework Decisions, ICC) increasingly shape national revision procedures.
  Obligations arising from ECtHR judgments (Article 46 ECHR) and EU instruments on in absentia trials and mutual recognition require states to ensure effective revision-based remedies.[2][4][83][98][99][100][101][104][105][110]

In essence, revision adds humanity and flexibility to criminal law. Its ultimate purpose is not to undermine the authority of final judgments, but to ensure that this authority rests on truth and fairness. Every admitted revision – whether freeing an innocent person or ensuring that a guilty person who escaped through fraud is held to account – reinforces trust in justice.

At the same time, the strict filters and low admission rates remind us that finality of proceedings is also a value. The challenge for legislators, courts and practitioners is to keep refining this balance so that the system remains both reliable and capable of self-correction in the face of error.

Useful sources

• Code of Criminal Procedure – Articles 453–465 (Portal Legislativ).[1][57]
  Complete regulation of the grounds for revision, conditions, procedure and effects in current Romanian legislation.
• Constitutional Court Decision no. 2/2017.[13][75][76]
  Exception of unconstitutionality upheld regarding the limitation of revision in peius for new facts.
• Constitutional Court Decision no. 126/2016 (and related Decisions no. 410/2019, 723/2019, 119/2022, 311/2024).[68][69][70][71][72][73][74]
  Case-law on revision where norms applied are declared unconstitutional and the condition that the exception be raised in the particular case.
• High Court of Cassation and Justice Decision no. 68/2020 (HP).[77]
  Clarifies that the ground under letter (f) applies also to final judgments in enforcement proceedings (e.g. Article 595 CPP).
• High Court of Cassation and Justice Decisions no. 2/2022 and no. 10/2023 (HP).[78][79][80][81]
  Interpretation of “judgments that cannot be reconciled” under Article 453(1)(e) CPP – exclusion of conflicts between criminal and civil judgments.
• ÎCCJ Decision no. 2/2015 – on Article 465 CPP (revision based on ECtHR judgments).[82]
• ECtHR, Moreira Ferreira v. Portugal (No. 2), GC, 2017.[2][4][83][98][99][100][101]
  On the role of reopening as execution of ECtHR judgments and the state’s margin of appreciation.
• ECtHR, Sanader v. Croatia, judgment of 12 February 2015.[105][106][107][120]
  Conviction in absentia – the lack of a real opportunity for retrial breaches Article 6.
• Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA and Article 4a of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA (EAW).[110]
  EU provisions on surrender in cases of in absentia judgments and guarantees of retrial.
• CEPEJ reports – European judicial systems (2020 edition).[116][117]
  Statistical data on compensation for miscarriages of justice in various countries – indirect indicator of successful revisions.
• Criminal Cases Review Commission – statistics and 25-year overview.[95][96][115]
  Data on applications, referrals and outcomes in the British review system.
• Nan et al., “Towards a European Right to Claim Innocence?” / “A European Approach to Revision in Criminal Matters?” (2020).[3][86][87][88][91][92][97][118]
  Comparative analysis of revision grounds in various European states and the trend towards simplification around the concept of novum.
• National Institute of Justice – commented case-law on extraordinary remedies.[111]
• Lumea Justiției article on success rates of extraordinary remedies at the ÎCCJ (2014–2020).[84][85][108][109][112][113][114]
• UNODC / BJA materials on wrongful conviction review programs (international comparative insights).[93][94]
• JURIST and eucrim reports on the German Federal Constitutional Court’s ruling on double jeopardy.[63][64][65][66][67][89][90]

[1] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] [44] [45] [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] [51] [52] [53] [54] [55] [56] [57] [58] [59] [60] [61] [62] [75] [76] [77] [80] [81] [102] [103] [119] CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE (A) 01/07/2010 – Portal Legislativ
https://legislatie.just.ro/Public/DetaliiDocumentAfis/265008

[2] [4] [83] [98] [99] [100] [101] hudoc.echr.coe.int
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/app/conversion/pdf/?library=ECHR&id=003-5788507-7361416&filename=Grand%20Chamber%20Judgment%20Moreira%20Ferreira%20v.%20Portugal%20

[3] [86] [87] [88] [91] [92] [97] [116] [117] repub.eur.nl
https://repub.eur.nl/pub/135562/ELR-D-21-00007.pdf

[63] [64] [65] [66] [67] [89] [90] German court rules double jeopardy statute unconstitutional – JURIST – News
https://www.jurist.org/news/2023/10/german-court-rules-double-jeopardy-statute-unconstitutional/

[68] [69] [70] [71] [72] [73] [74] CCR Decision on the revision of final criminal judgments concerning the criminal limb in cases of unconstitutionality of the applied norms – Bihor Just
https://www.bihorjust.ro/decizia-ccr-privind-revizuirea-hotararilor-judecatoresti-definitive-privind-latura-penala-in-cazurile-de-neconstitutionalitate-a-normelor-aplicate/

[78] [79] DECISION 10 13/02/2023 – Portal Legislativ
https://legislatie.just.ro/Public/DetaliiDocument/266531

[82] High Court of Cassation and Justice Decision no. 2/2015: Art. 465 (“Revision in the case of judgments …
https://www.universuljuridic.ro/cod-procedura-penala-decizia-iccj-2-2015-art-465-revizuirea-in-cazul-hotararilor-cedo/

[84] [85] [108] [109] [112] [113] [114] EXTRAORDINARY REMEDIES REMAIN HARD TO GET THROUGH – Exclusive. The High Court of Cassation and Justice admitted in 2014–2020 fewer than 1 in 7 extraordinary remedies in criminal matters. Most success: appeals in cassation, with 15.55% admitted. Contestations in annulment admitted: 6.9%. Revisions: 5.62% chances of success. Appeals in cassation remain the most numerous. Contestations in annulment were in 2014 almost as many, but by 2016 they dropped abruptly to the level of revisions (Statistics) EXTRAORDINARY REMEDIES REMAIN HARD TO GET THROUGH – Exclusive. The High Court of Cassation and Justice admitted in 2014–2020 fewer than 1 in 7 extraordinary remedies in criminal matters. Most success: appeals in cassation, with 15.55% admitted. Contestations in annulment admitted: 6.9%. Revizuiril
https://www.luju.ro/caile-extraordinare-raman-greu-de-razbit-exclusiv-iccj-a-admis-in-2014-2020-mai-putin-de-1-din-7-cai-extraordinare-de-atac-in-materie-penala-cel-mai-mult-succes-recursurile-in-casatie-cu-15-55-admise-contestatii-in-anulare-admise-6-9-revizuirile-5-62-sort

[93] [PDF] The Status and Role of Prosecutors
https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/14-07304_ebook.pdf

[94] Upholding the Rule of Law: Wrongful Conviction Review Program
https://bja.ojp.gov/program/urlpwc/overview

[95] [96] The Criminal Cases Review Commission – A Quarter of a Century On
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/00220183251336101

[104] [PDF] Following conviction of war crimes in his absence, defendant should …
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/app/conversion/pdf/?library=ECHR&id=003-5012983-6154373&filename=003-5012983-6154373.pdf

[105] [106] [107] [120] European Court of Human Rights Rules Croatia Must Provide Defendant Convicted In Absentia of War Crimes Sufficient Possibility for Retrial (February 12, 2015) | ASIL
https://www.asil.org/blogs/european-court-human-rights-rules-croatia-must-provide-defendant-convicted-absentia-war-crimes

[110] CJEU Clarifies Conditions for Trials and Convictions in absentia
https://eucrim.eu/news/cjeu-clarifies-conditions-for-trials-and-convictions-in-absentia/

[111] [PDF] Commented case-law and problems of judicial practice – inj.md
https://www.inj.md/sites/default/files/new/21/Osoianu.Chirtoaca.46-52_21%20%281%29.pdf

[115] CCRC launches library of every referral made since 1997
https://ccrc.gov.uk/news/ccrc-launches-library-of-every-referral-made-since-1997/

[118] [PDF] Towards a European Right to Claim Innocence?
https://www.europeanpapers.eu/system/files/pdf_version/EP_eJ_2020_3_14_Articles_SS2_6_Joost_Nan_Sjarai_Lestrade_00428_0.pdf