1. Why money laundering is a “sensitive” offence
In recent years, the term “money laundering” has moved out of the technical language of compliance officers and specialised prosecutors (DIICOT, DNA) and into public debate: press releases, media cases, bank reports and even day-to-day conversations. Any atypical transaction or cash flow that is difficult to explain risks being labelled – sometimes abusively – as “money laundering”. At the same time, both national and European legislation have become stricter, and financial institutions, notaries, lawyers and other professionals are subject to increasingly demanding reporting obligations.
For someone directly targeted by a criminal money laundering file, the offence is not just a label in a press article. The risks are significant: prison sentences, extended confiscation of assets, frozen bank accounts, garnishments, and major difficulties in continuing to work with banks or serious business partners. Even a mere suspicion – materialised through a suspicious transaction report or a notification sent to the criminal investigation authorities – can have very concrete effects on one’s professional and personal life.
In this context, it is crucial to understand what money laundering actually means, in legal terms, in Romania: what conduct is criminalised, which penalties apply, how it relates to the so‑called “predicate offence” (for instance tax evasion, corruption, drug trafficking), what obligations reporting entities have under Law no. 129/2019 and, above all, how criminal money laundering cases are actually analysed in practice.
This article aims to provide an overview in accessible language, but firmly grounded in the Romanian Criminal Code, Law no. 129/2019 on preventing and combating money laundering, EU directives and recent case‑law. It is not legal advice and cannot replace an individual assessment by a lawyer in a specific case, but it can help you better understand what is really at stake when you are faced with a suspicion or accusation of money laundering.
2. Current legal framework: Criminal Code, Law no. 129/2019 and EU law
Today, the legal framework on money laundering in Romania is built primarily around two pillars:
– the Criminal Code (which sets out the elements of the offence, the forms of participation and the rules on confiscation);
– Law no. 129/2019 on preventing and combating money laundering and terrorist financing, which replaced former Law no. 656/2002 and transposes the relevant EU anti‑money laundering directives.
In essence, the Criminal Code defines what constitutes the offence of money laundering, the possible ways it can be committed, the range of penalties, aggravated forms and the rules governing confiscation of the proceeds of crime. Law no. 129/2019 regulates, in parallel, the “preventive” side: which entities are subject to anti‑money laundering obligations, how they must identify their clients, how they must verify the source of funds, and when they must send suspicious transaction reports to the National Office for Preventing and Combating Money Laundering.
At EU level, Directive (EU) 2015/849 (the Fourth Anti‑Money Laundering Directive) and Directive (EU) 2018/843 (the Fifth AML Directive) set minimum standards for the criminalisation of money laundering, customer due diligence, beneficial ownership transparency, central registers and cooperation between authorities. Romania was required to align its domestic legislation with these standards, and Law no. 129/2019 is the direct result of that process.
In practice, for a person under criminal investigation or on trial for money laundering, these two dimensions – the criminal law aspect and the preventive‑compliance aspect – usually intersect. Investigators frequently rely on suspicious transaction reports, know‑your‑customer documentation and internal financial analyses generated under Law no. 129/2019 as a starting point for building a money laundering case in the sense of the Criminal Code.
3. How money laundering is defined: the three main categories of conduct
Classically, money laundering is described through three broad categories of acts involving “dirty money” – i.e. proceeds from criminal activity: conversion/transfer, concealment/disguise, and acquisition/possession/use. The Romanian legislator follows this structure, so, in broad terms, a person commits money laundering when he or she:
– converts or transfers property, knowing that it is the proceeds of crime, for the purpose of concealing its illicit origin or helping the person who committed the predicate offence evade the legal consequences;
– conceals or disguises the true nature, source, location, disposition, movement, ownership or rights with respect to property, knowing that such property is derived from crime;
– acquires, possesses or uses property, knowing that it comes from criminal activity.
The law focuses on two key elements: the illicit origin of the property (there is an underlying criminal offence – the “predicate offence”) and the mental element (the person’s knowledge that the property is criminal proceeds and, in some forms, the purpose of hiding that origin). This is not only about “men carrying suitcases of cash”, but also about apparently respectable banking operations, clean‑looking companies and carefully drafted contracts used to disguise funds derived from criminal activity.
In practice, each of the three categories raises specific issues: for conversion/transfer, the focus falls on the flow of transactions and the economic rationale of the operations; for concealment/disguise, the debate revolves around intermediary structures, nominees and sham contracts; for acquisition/possession/use, the key questions concern what the person knew or should reasonably have suspected about the origin of the funds.
4. The predicate offence: does it need to be proven?
One of the most delicate aspects in money laundering cases is the relationship between this offence and the earlier offence which generated the funds (the “predicate offence”). As a matter of principle, money laundering is an autonomous offence: a person can be convicted of money laundering even if he or she is not the author of the predicate offence or even if that author has not been identified.
However, for money laundering to exist, the court must be satisfied that the property in question originates from an act which constitutes a criminal offence. A final conviction for the predicate offence is not always required, but the prosecuting authorities must demonstrate, on the basis of evidence, at least a serious probability that the funds are of illicit origin – for example from tax evasion, corruption, drug trafficking, theft, fraud or other crimes.
Case‑law, both domestic and European, has insisted that a file cannot be built solely on the presumption that “the amounts are too large to be legal” or that “the person’s lifestyle is incompatible with declared income” without some minimum factual basis concerning an underlying offence. At the same time, courts have accepted that the predicate offence can be examined primarily at a factual level (what actually happened), without a fully crystallised and final legal classification being strictly necessary.
For the defence, this is often the core of the strategy: challenging the alleged causal link between the supposed predicate offence and the money flows, disputing the prosecution’s interpretation of complex economic transactions, or proving the lawful origin of income which, at first glance, appeared suspicious.
5. Penalties for money laundering and aggravated forms
Money laundering traditionally carries relatively high penalties, reflecting the idea that it is the “financial engine” of organised crime. The exact range of imprisonment and fines is set out in the Criminal Code, with possibilities for increased penalties in certain situations (for example, when the offence is committed by an organised group or in a continuous form).
Confiscation plays a central role in money laundering cases. The issue is not only whether a prison sentence or criminal fine will be imposed, but also whether the court will order special confiscation of the proceeds of the offence and of any property used to commit it, as well as extended confiscation in certain circumstances. Extended confiscation allows the state to seize assets whose value clearly exceeds the person’s legitimate income where there are strong indications that the difference stems from criminal activities.
Another important aspect is the criminal liability of legal entities. In recent practice, there have been many cases where, alongside the director or beneficial owner, the company itself has been indicted for money laundering, facing significant criminal fines and, in extreme situations, the risk of dissolution or suspension of activities. For a business, such an accusation is not only a criminal case on paper, but a reputational and operational shock which may fundamentally affect relationships with banks, suppliers and clients.
When determining the sentence, courts typically consider, among other things, the value of the sums involved, the duration and complexity of the operations, the number of participants, the existence of elaborate planning, any prior convictions, as well as the person’s conduct during proceedings (degree of cooperation with the authorities, efforts to repair the damage, plea agreements, etc.).
6. The relationship with tax evasion and other economic offences
Very often, money laundering appears “in a package” with offences such as tax evasion, embezzlement, abuse of office or fraud. In the tax field in particular, one recurring question is: does any use of amounts obtained through tax evasion automatically constitute money laundering?
The answer is more nuanced. One line of legal argument, supported in part of the doctrine, is that the mere use by the author of tax evasion proceeds in everyday life (payment of personal expenses, consumption) should not, in itself, be qualified as money laundering in the absence of additional acts of disguise or integration into the lawful economy. On the other hand, where undeclared income is channelled through corporate structures, sham loans, consultancy contracts without real content or successive transfers between intermediary accounts, the suspicion of money laundering becomes far more concrete.
Similarly, in corruption cases, drug trafficking or human trafficking, a money laundering component almost inevitably emerges: the funds have to be “cleaned” in order to be used for property acquisitions, luxury cars, investments or apparently legitimate businesses. Here, the probative focus shifts to how transactions were structured, the role of nominees and the economic justification of financial flows.
For the accused, this usually means facing a double risk: sanction for the predicate offence and an additional sanction for laundering the proceeds of that offence. The defence strategy must address both levels coherently and avoid scenarios where, for example, a plea or settlement in a tax evasion case inadvertently paves the way for an additional money laundering accusation.
7. Money laundering cases in practice: evidence, expert reports, financial trails
From an evidentiary point of view, money laundering files are by definition “paper and numbers” cases: bank statements, contracts, invoices, emails and other correspondence, suspicious transaction reports, analyses by the Financial Intelligence Unit, banks’ internal compliance reports, accounting and financial expert opinions.
Typically, the prosecution will attempt to reconstruct a financial trail: where the money comes from, which accounts it has passed through, what contractual justifications were used, what assets were purchased, and how all this compares to the lawful income declared by the persons involved. This endeavour is inevitably selective: not every movement of funds can be followed ad infinitum, and certain interpretations of financial flows may be debatable.
For the defence, the key is to show that there are plausible economic explanations for transactions that may look suspicious at first glance. In practice, this means building a “counter‑file”: supporting documents, contractual explanations, business logic for particular loans, investments or intra‑group operations. In many cases, a thorough expert report and a well‑organised set of documents can significantly challenge the conclusions of an initial financial analysis prepared for the prosecution.
It is important to understand that, when assessing the evidence, the court is not bound by the labels used by the prosecution. The judge may reach a different view on whether a transaction is truly “suspicious”, and may consider that certain operations are mere expressions of economic freedom or even of poor but non‑criminal business judgment. This is precisely why a criminal file should be analysed not only through the formal lens of reports and summaries, but also through the underlying economic reality they describe.
8. Rights of the suspect and defendant in a money laundering case
Despite the economic complexity, a money laundering case is still, legally, a “classic” criminal file in which all guarantees of the Code of Criminal Procedure apply. The suspect and defendant have the right to be informed of the accusation, the right to remain silent, the right to be assisted by a lawyer, the right to consult the file (subject to the statutory limitations), the right to request evidence, to challenge procedural acts, to appeal interim measures and to contest the prosecutor’s decisions.
In money laundering cases in particular, protective measures (seizure of bank accounts, garnishments, freezing of assets) are the rule rather than the exception. The defence must pay close attention to how such measures are ordered and maintained: whether there is a reasonable proportionality between the value of seized assets and the alleged damage or illicit proceeds, whether a partial lifting of seizure or a substitution with guarantees can be obtained, and whether legitimate economic activities are being unduly paralysed.
The lawyer’s role in this context is not purely technical – a matter of citing articles from the law. A competent defence requires understanding the client’s business model, the way the industry in question operates, the types of transactions that are standard practice in that sector and the specific risk profile. Only then can the lawyer build a credible defence narrative, explaining to the court that not every atypical financial structure is a front for money laundering.
9. Reporting obligations (banks, notaries, lawyers, accountants) and the risk of over‑reporting
Law no. 129/2019 contains an extensive list of reporting entities: credit institutions, financial institutions, auditors, chartered accountants, tax advisers, valuers, notaries, lawyers, bailiffs, real estate agents, gambling service providers and others. They are required to know their clients, apply customer due diligence measures and report suspicious transactions to the National Office for Preventing and Combating Money Laundering.
In theory, these reports should only cover situations where there are genuine indicators of suspicion: inconsistency between the client’s profile and the transactions carried out, artificial structures, the use of high‑risk jurisdictions, lack of plausible economic justification and so on. In practice, however, out of fear of administrative sanctions, some entities tend to “over‑report”, sending to the Office transactions which, strictly from a criminal law perspective, do not necessarily raise substantial issues.
For the person concerned, the practical effect may be the same: a cautious report submitted by a bank or other professional can turn into a full‑blown criminal case. It is therefore important that, once the authorities have taken an interest, the person treats the situation seriously, clarifies and documents the source of funds, and works with their lawyer to build a coherent, evidence‑based position.
At the same time, for professionals subject to Law no. 129/2019, delicate issues arise in balancing the reporting obligation with professional secrecy (particularly for lawyers) and the confidentiality of the client relationship. A lawyer involved in such a context must be very clear about the legal limits and exceptions to the reporting obligation, so as to avoid both breaching the law and unjustifiably compromising the client’s interests.
10. Conclusions: how to look realistically at a money laundering accusation
Money laundering is not a cosmetic offence added at the end of an indictment. It entails serious criminal risks, the possibility of losing valuable assets through confiscation, public stigmatisation and very real disruption of ongoing business activities. At the same time, not every atypical transaction, not every complex corporate structure and not every tax dispute automatically gives rise to money laundering.
For someone targeted by such a case, the first step is to understand precisely what the accusation is, which concrete acts are alleged, which financial flows the prosecution relies on and what connection is asserted between those flows and an underlying offence. The second step is to build, together with a lawyer, a “parallel file” of one’s own: supporting documents, economic explanations, expert reports, witnesses.
This article is for information purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Every money laundering case has its own particularities: different types of predicate offences, different corporate structures, different economic contexts. A defence strategy that works in one file may be completely unsuitable in another. If you are the subject of a suspicion or accusation of money laundering, you should seek individual advice from a lawyer before making decisions that could affect, in the long term, your assets, your professional activity and even your liberty.
Useful sources (legislation, guidance and international resources)
• Romanian Criminal Code – consolidated text (including provisions on money laundering and extended confiscation), available in PDF format on the SNPPC website and in updated form on the official Legislative Portal.
• Law no. 129/2019 on preventing and combating money laundering and terrorist financing – full text (as amended), published on legislatie.just.ro and on the website of the National Office for Preventing and Combating Money Laundering.
• National Office for Preventing and Combating Money Laundering (ONPCSB) – official information, annual reports, reporting guidelines and suspicious transaction indicators, available at onpcsb.ro.
• Directive (EU) 2015/849 (Fourth AML Directive) and Directive (EU) 2018/843 (Fifth AML Directive) – official texts published on EUR-Lex (2015/849) and EUR-Lex (2018/843).
• FATF (Financial Action Task Force) – recommendations, typology reports and country evaluations on money laundering and terrorist financing, available at fatf-gafi.org, useful for understanding international standards and common money laundering patterns.
• MONEYVAL – Council of Europe evaluation reports on Romania’s anti‑money laundering framework, published on the MONEYVAL website.
• Relevant case‑law of the High Court of Cassation and Justice of Romania on money laundering – decisions published on scj.ro, searchable by keywords and Criminal Code provisions.
• Romanian legal commentary and practice notes on money laundering – for example, articles published on JURIDICE.ro and Universul Juridic, which often discuss the interaction between money laundering, tax evasion and other economic offences.